The trade effects of cultural distance and economic sanctions : a structural gravity approach by Frank, Jonas
Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
THE TRADE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL
DISTANCE AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:
A STRUCTURAL GRAVITY APPROACH
Jonas Frank, M.Sc.
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des
akademischen Grades eines Doktors der
Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. oec.)
Datum der Abgabe: 04.06.2018
Datum der mündl. Prüfung: 16.10.2018
1. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Benjamin Jung
2. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Thomas Beißinger

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Benjamin Jung for supervising my thesis. I have beneﬁted a
great deal from his expertise and thorough feedback. Moreover, I am grateful that
he encouraged me to visit summer schools and conferences that have developed
me as an economist. Many thanks also to Thomas Beißinger, to whom I owe my
entry into the academic world. I am more than privileged to have both Benjamin
and Thomas as my advisors.
Many thanks to all my friends and colleagues in Hohenheim, especially to An-
dreas, Anita, Henning, Sebastian, Sophie, and Timo, who have all contributed in
their way to a very pleasant working environment that eased the pain of writing
this thesis. Special thanks has to go to Marius, with whom I have shared countless
pub nights, many of them dedicated to research. His thoughts and insights helped
me a great deal in writing this thesis and coming to a conclusion. I am indebted to
Virginia, for her encouragement throughout the years and her tireless proofread-
ing eﬀorts. Exceptional gratitude goes to Constanze for helping me through the
last stretches of my doctoral studies by providing unwavering support and much
needed distraction.
Last but not least I owe a great deal to my parents, Peter and Kristina, for their
patience, encouragement, and support not only during my academic career, but
throughout my whole life. Without all of you, I would not be ﬁnished today.
I
II
Contents
List of Tables V
List of Figures IX
1 Introduction 1
2 A Brief History of Gravity 7
3 Culture and Trade - New Evidence from the GLOBE Data Set 11
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 Cultural distance dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4 Data and estimation strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.5 Cultural distance estimation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.6 Cultural proximity estimation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.A Additional tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4 The Eﬀects of Culture on Trade over Time - New Evidence from
the GLOBE Data Set 69
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
III
4.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 Cultural distance dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.5 Estimation strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.7 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.A Additional tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5 The Eﬀects of Economic Sanctions on Trade: New Evidence from
a Panel PPML Gravity Approach 107
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.4 Estimation strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.5.1 Trade destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.5.2 Trade diversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.A Additional tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6 Conclusion 139
Bibliography i
IV
List of Tables
3.1 Summary statistics of GLOBE dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Summary statistics of cultural distance data set . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance: OLS estimation (basic
sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.4 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance: PPML estimation (basic
sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.5 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance: PPML estimation (basic
sample+zeros in trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.6 Trade eﬀects of cultural distance: PPML estimation (basic sample+zeros
in trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.7 Trade eﬀects of cultural distance: PPML estimation (basic sample+zeros
in trade+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.8 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity: OLS estimation (basic
sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.9 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity: OLS estimation (basic
sample+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.10 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity: PPML estimation (ba-
sic sample+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.11 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity: PPML estimation (ba-
sic sample+zeros in trade+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.A.1 Country rank per GLOBE dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
V
3.A.2 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (aggregate trade): OLS
estimation (basic sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.A.3 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (homogeneous goods):
OLS estimation (basic sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.A.4 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (diﬀerentiated goods):
OLS estimation (basic sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.A.5 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (aggregate trade): PPML
estimation (basic sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.A.6 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (homogeneous goods):
PPML estimation (basic sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.A.7 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (diﬀerentiated goods):
PPML estimation (basic sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.A.8 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (aggregate trade): PPML
estimation (basic sample+zeros in trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.A.9 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (homogeneous goods):
PPML estimation (basic sample+zeros in trade) . . . . . . . . . 49
3.A.10 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (diﬀerentiated goods):
PPML estimation (basic sample+zeros in trade) . . . . . . . . . 50
3.A.11 Trade eﬀects of cultural distance (aggregate trade): PPML estim-
ation (basic sample+zeros in trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.A.12 Trade eﬀects of cultural distance (homogeneous goods): PPML
estimation (basic sample+zeros in trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.A.13 Trade eﬀects of cultural distance (diﬀerentiated goods): PPML
estimation (basic sample+zeros in trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.A.14 Trade eﬀects of cultural distance (aggregate trade): PPML estim-
ation (basic sample+zeros in trade+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . . . 54
3.A.15 Trade eﬀects of cultural distance (homogeneous goods): PPML
estimation (basic sample+zeros in trade+intra-nat. trade) . . . . 55
3.A.16 Trade eﬀects of cultural distance (diﬀerentiated goods): PPML
estimation (basic sample+zeros in trade+intra-nat. trade) . . . . 56
VI
3.A.17 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (aggregate trade): OLS
estimation (basic sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.A.18 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (homogeneous goods):
OLS estimation (basic sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.A.19 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (diﬀerentiated goods):
OLS estimation (basic sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.A.20 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (aggregate trade): OLS
estimation (basic sample+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.A.21 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (homogeneous goods):
OLS estimation (basic sample+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . . . . . 61
3.A.22 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (diﬀerentiated goods):
OLS estimation (basic sample+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . . . . . 62
3.A.23 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (aggregate trade): PPML
estimation (basic sample+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.A.24 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (homogeneous goods):
PPML estimation (basic sample+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . . . . 64
3.A.25 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (diﬀerentiated goods):
PPML estimation (basic sample+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . . . . 65
3.A.26 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (aggregate trade): PPML
estimation (basic sample+zeros in trade+intra-nat. trade) . . . . 66
3.A.27 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (homogeneous goods):
PPML estimation (basic sample+zeros in trade+intra-nat. trade) 67
3.A.28 Trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (diﬀerentiated goods):
PPML estimation (basic sample+zeros in trade+intra-nat. trade) 68
4.1 Average trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance: Panel PPML
estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2 Time-varying trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance: Panel PPML
estimation (basic sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3 Time-varying trade eﬀects of cultural distance: Panel PPML es-
timation (basic sample+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
VII
4.4 Time-varying trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity: Panel
PPML estimation (basic sample+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . . . . 87
4.A.1 Average trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (aggregate trade):
Panel PPML estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.A.2 Average trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (homogeneous
goods): Panel PPML estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.A.3 Average trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (diﬀerentiated
goods): Panel PPML estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.A.4 Time varying trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (aggregate
trade): Panel PPML estimation (basic sample) . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.A.5 Time-varying trade eﬀect of logged cultural distance (homogen-
eous goods): Panel PPML estimation (basic sample) . . . . . . . 95
4.A.6 Time-varying trade eﬀects of logged cultural distance (diﬀerenti-
ated goods): Panel PPML estimation (basic sample) . . . . . . . 96
4.A.7 Time-varying trade eﬀects of cultural distance (aggregate trade):
Panel PPML estimation (basic sample+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . 97
4.A.8 Time-varying trade eﬀects of cultural distance (homogeneous goods):
Panel PPML estimation (basic sample+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . 98
4.A.9 Time-varying trade eﬀects of cultural distance (diﬀerentiated goods):
Panel PPML estimation (basic sample+intra-nat. trade) . . . . . 99
4.A.10 Time-varying trade eﬀects of unscaled cultural distance (aggregate
trade): Panel PPML estimation (basic sample+intra-nat. trade) 100
4.A.11 Time-varying trade eﬀects of unscaled cultural distance (homo-
geneous goods): Panel PPML estimation (basic sample+intra-nat.
trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.A.12 Time-varying trade eﬀects of unscaled cultural distance (diﬀeren-
tiated goods): Panel PPML estimation (basic sample+intra-nat.
trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.A.13 Time-varying trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (aggregate
trade): Panel PPML estimation (basic sample+intra-nat. trade) 103
VIII
4.A.14 Time-varying trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (homogen-
eous goods): Panel PPML estimation (basic sample+intra-nat.
trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.A.15 Time-varying trade eﬀects of logged cultural proximity (diﬀeren-
tiated goods): Panel PPML estimation (basic sample+intra-nat.
trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.1 Summary statistics of sanctions data set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2 Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.3 Test for exogeneity of policy variables: PPML estimation . . . . 118
5.4 Trade eﬀects of economics sanctions by severity . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.5 Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: PPML estimation
(annual data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.6 Trade-diversion eﬀects of economic sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.A.1 Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.A.2 Test for exogeneity of policy variables: PPML estimation . . . . 131
5.A.3 Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: FE estimation . 132
5.A.4 Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: FD estimation . 133
5.A.5 Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: PPML estimation
(FE sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.A.6 Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: PPML estimation
(full sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.A.7 Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: PPML estimation
(annual data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.A.8 Trade-diversion eﬀects of economic sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . 137
IX
X
List of Figures
5.1 Number of sanctions per year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
XI
XII
Chapter 1
Introduction
The value of worldwide exports of goods and services has increased over the last
30 years, from 3 trillion US$ in 1987 to over 20 trillion US$ in 2017.1 Moreover, its
importance for world GDP has risen during the last decades: the share of global
goods' and services' exports of world GDP increased from 18 percent in 1987 to
29 percent in 2017.2
These dramatic changes can be largely attributed to lower trade costs. Since the
foundation of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, the
member countries have continuously worked to promote trade and competition
across borders by reducing tariﬀs. The Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1994 lead
to an average reduction of the most favored nation ad valorem tariﬀ rate from 17
percent to 10 percent (Caliendo et al., 2015).
In 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) succeeded the GATT and nowadays
counts 164 member countries which account for more than 98 percent of world
trade volume in 2016 (Koopman & Maurer, 2017). However, the eﬀorts of trade
liberalization with respect to tariﬀ reduction have slowed down compared to 1994,
especially after the (aborted) Doha Round which started in 2001 and resulted in
the Bali agreement in 2013. Instead of clear commitments to decrease tariﬀ rates
further, the member countries could only agree to facilitate trade by reducing
non-tariﬀ barriers and enhancing trade-related infrastructure, without concrete
promises. As a consequence, instead of multilateral trade agreements the number
1in current US$. Data source: World Development Indicators.
2Data source: World Development Indicators
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of regional trade agreements (RTAs) between WTOmembers has grown even faster
than before.
Apart from tariﬀ reductions, other barriers to trade have decreased as well. On the
one hand, means of transport across the globe became faster and cheaper. Global
standardization of containerization, for example, allowed for quicker (un-)loading
of manufactured goods, which in turn greatly reduced port costs (Levinson, 2016)
and increased the productivity of dock labor from 1.7 tons in 1965 to 30 tons
per hour in 1970 (Bernhofen et al., 2016). Moreover, air transport costs fell by
90 percent between 1955 to 2004 (Hummels, 2007). On the other hand, recent
improvements in telecommunications technology also lead to a reduction of costs.
For example, costs for international telephone calls per minute decreased by 95
percent from 1980 to 2010 (US Federal Communications Commission, 2012) and
the invention of the internet allowed for (nearly) frictionless long-distance inform-
ation ﬂows at monetary costs of almost zero. These trends serve as evidence for
Friedman (2005) and others who claim that the world is becoming more and more
borderless or "ﬂat".
However, Head and Mayer (2013) compellingly show that the world is still far away
from a state of complete globalization. Despite all of the dramatic developments in
the last decades, current trade levels are still much lower than the ones that would
occur in the absence of trade impediments. Head and Mayer (2013) compute the
"globalization gap" between a benchmark of complete openness, in which products
from abroad are just as accessible and desirable as domestic ones, and observed
openness3. They ﬁnd that the level of observed openness is less than one-third
compared to the benchmark. This gap has been relatively persistent over the last
ﬁve decades. Hence, there must be trade barriers other than tariﬀs and trans-
portation costs. A large part of these trade barriers are not directly observable
(Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and Head and Mayer (2013)).
In my dissertation project, I contribute to the empirical literature that aims at ex-
ploring the trade eﬀects of these type of trade barriers in several ways. First, I ex-
ploit the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavioral Eﬀectiveness (GLOBE)
data set (House et al., 2013) to derive proxies for, respectively, cultural distance
and cultural proximity between countries. Second, I use these proxies to explain
bilateral trade ﬂows. Third, I explore whether the eﬀect of cultural distance on
trade ﬂows varies over time. Finally, I analyze the eﬀect of economic sanctions
on bilateral trade ﬂows. For the analyses, I utilize a structural gravity approach
and employ a modern estimation technique, namely the Poisson Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) estimator. There are several reasons, why I choose the gravity
3Openness is deﬁned as world imports of goods and services divided by world GDP.
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framework for my empirical analyses: On the one hand, the model has solid the-
oretical foundations, which continuously grew over the last 30 years. On the other
hand, the predictive power of empirical gravity equations is remarkably high and
the estimators are consistent if modern estimation techniques are applied. Last
but not least, the model is very intuitive.4
Culture and Trade - New Evidence from the GLOBE Data Set. With the help of a
simple calculation, Grossman (1998) shows that estimated geographical distance
eﬀects are too large to be explained by shipping costs alone. He then speculates
that cultural diﬀerences or lack of familiarity are the main reasons why distance
matters so much. One of the key challenges is, how "culture" can (or should) be
measured. Since it is a collective term, it combines various aspects like common
values, religion, language, or institutions. This sparked a branch of literature on
its own.5 In chapter 3, I add to this literature and draw on the GLOBE research
study by House et al. (2013) to derive a proxy for measuring unobserved cultural
distance. The study identiﬁes nine cultural dimensions. Unlike other studies,
GLOBE focuses exclusively on managers, allowing for a distinct glimpse into the
values of people actually making trade decisions.
In order to quantify the eﬀect of cultural diﬀerences on the value of trade I use
several speciﬁcations of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and PPML to estimate the
gravity equation with a cross-section for 1994. Following Yotov (2012), I include
intra-national together with international trade ﬂows. Furthermore, I provide
evidence how cultural diﬀerences aﬀect diﬀerent goods based on the product clas-
siﬁcation by Rauch (1999).
The results show that several GLOBE measures signiﬁcantly reduce trade between
country pairs within the sample and enhance trade for others. The results diﬀer
severely across the goods speciﬁcations. Furthermore, the results strongly depend
on the choice of the econometric method.
The Eﬀects of Culture on Trade over Time - New Evidence from the GLOBE Data
Set. In chapter 4, I focus on the question, whether the eﬀect of cultural diﬀer-
ences on trade values discussed in chapter 3 changes over time, or if it remains
persistent. On the one hand, it may be possible that due to increased globalization
the world has grown closer and cultural diﬀerences have lost their importance for
international trade. On the other hand, it could be possible that fear of losing cul-
tural identity has grown, leading to a stronger impact of national values, precisely
because of the globalization process. I draw on the data set used in chapter 3, but
4Yotov et al. (2016) provide a compelling guide to trade policy analysis with help of the
structural gravity model.
5An overview is given in chapter 3.
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put it into a panel data setting.
I make use of a state-of-the-art PPML approach using data on international trade
ﬂows together with intra-national trade ﬂows (Yotov, 2012) and a comprehensive
set of ﬁxed eﬀects including country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects as proposed by Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) to consistently estimate a gravity equation using a panel from
1995 to 2004. I distinguish between diﬀerent industries by making use of the goods
classiﬁcations following Rauch (1999).
The results show that cultural diﬀerences indeed aﬀect trade values diﬀerently over
time, but their size and impact depends on the chosen measure of cultural distance
and on the industry classiﬁcation.
The Eﬀects of Economic Sanctions on Trade: New Evidence from a Panel PPML
Gravity Approach. Instead of trade barriers that are not directly observable but
have to be estimated with the help of proxy variables, the focus of chapter 5 lies on a
precisely measurable aspect of trade barriers: economic sanctions. At a ﬁrst glance,
the eﬀect of economic sanctions on trade seems to be trivial. If a country bans
trade with another country, bilateral trade should be reduced to zero, comparable
to the eﬀect of an inﬁnitely high tariﬀ. But this only happens, if bilateral trade
is completely blocked. In reality, however, these dramatic measures are hardly
applied. Most sanctions only target speciﬁc sectors or do not directly inﬂuence
trade, like travel bans or the freezing of assets. Therefore, the eﬀect of sanctions
on trade is more complex. Moreover, the magnitude of the eﬀect of sanctions (and
its chance of success) depends on the relative importance of the targeted sector(s)
for the target country's economy. Economic sanctions are a popular diplomatic
tool for countries to enforce political interests abroad or to punish non-complying
countries. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about whether this tool is
eﬀective in reaching these goals.
I analyze the consequences of active economic sanctions on bilateral trade values
between 1987 and 2005 by using the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions
(TIES) data set (Morgan et al., 2014). In order to quantify the direct eﬀects
of sanctions on the trade ﬂows between countries I use PPML as well as several
other econometric speciﬁcations to estimate the gravity equation with country pair,
sender-time, and target-time ﬁxed eﬀects (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). Following
Yotov (2012), I include intra-national as well as international trade ﬂows.
The estimates reveal that there is a signiﬁcant decrease in the value of trade after
the introduction of economic sanctions, which turns out to be driven by moderate
sanctions. Limited and extensive sanctions do not turn out to signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
ence trade. I additionally check if countries that are aﬀected by sanctions switch
4
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to other trade partners. However, I ﬁnd no robust evidence for such behavior and
third-country eﬀects.
The dissertation is structured as follows. In chapter 2, I provide a short intro-
duction of the gravity equation. I give an overview of the evolution of the gravity
equation in the context of international economics over the last decades including
the most recent developments. Afterwards, the empirical essays are presented in
chapters 3 to 5. The ﬁnal chapter summarizes the main ﬁndings and provides an
outlook for further research.
5
6
Chapter 2
A Brief History of Gravity
The gravity equation is one of the most popular and successful models in econom-
ics. It has been used in hundreds of papers which aimed to study and quantify the
eﬀects of determinants of international trade. In this chapter, I give a brief over-
view regarding the evolution of the gravity equation from its early beginnings until
the most recent developments by highlighting and describing important milestones.
The gravity equation is based on Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation from
1687, which states that the gravitational force Fij exerted on object i by object j
is proportional to the massMi andMj of the two objects and inversely proportional
to the square of the distance Dij between them:
Fij ∝ G ∗ MiMj
(Dij)2
,
whereG > 0 is the universal gravitational constant. Nowadays, it is one of the most
successful and widely used empirical tools to explain trade ﬂows but its general
acceptance took quite a long time: Ravenstein (1885) and Ravenstein (1889) were
the ﬁrst to apply this concept from natural sciences to economics and used it
to model migration patterns within the United Kingdom. Tinbergen (1962) ﬁrst
used the gravity model to empirically explain international trade ﬂows. Translated
from physics to economics, his model states that trade ﬂows Xij from origin i to
destination j are proportional to the economic sizes of the origin and destination
country, Yi and Yj respectively, and inversely related to the geographical distance
7
Dij between the two.
Xij = c ∗
Y β1i Y
β2
j
Dβ3ij ,
where c > 0 is some constant. Since his work was purely empirical, the research
community largely dismissed it due to gravity's lack of (trade) theoretical under-
pinnings. It took several more years until Anderson (1979) developed an economic
model that provided the necessary theoretical foundation. His gravity model fea-
tures a constant elasticity of substitution import demand system and Armington-
style product diﬀerentiation by place of origin. Gains from trade arise from the
consumption side. However, at this time, this did not inspire much attention in
the community of trade economists.
This changed in the year 1995. Treﬂer (1995) ﬁnds that traditional trade models
predict higher trade than is actually observed. As a consequence, he stresses the
importance of understanding and including hindrances to trade into the analysis.
In the same year, Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) provide a graphical persuasion via
a scatter diagram illustrating the negative and quasi-linear relationship between
distance and bilateral trade volume for West Germany in 1985 to show that dis-
tance matters (a lot). In addition, the authors state that the estimators of gravity
models "have produced some of the clearest and most robust ﬁndings in econom-
ics. But, paradoxically, they have had virtually no eﬀect on the subject of interna-
tional economics" (Handbook of International Economics, chapter 26, page 1384).
Krugman (1995) verbally points out why sizes and distances of other economies
matter for the bilateral value of trade. He concludes that, so far, there is no found-
ation in trade theory that allows for a good analysis of multilateral trade in the
presence of transport costs. With the help of a gravity equation, McCallum (1995)
shows that borders still negatively inﬂuence trade even in the presence of RTAs
like the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union. In his
case study, he uses previously unexploited data of inter-provincial trade between
10 Canadian provinces and 30 United States (US) federal states for 1998. He es-
timates that trade among Canada's provinces is 2200 percent larger than trade
between the Canadian provinces and the US. This puzzling result is addressed by
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). They demonstrate that McCallum's (1995)
estimates suﬀer from omitted variable bias1 and solve this issue by re-deﬁning the
gravity equation, building on the theoretical framework by Anderson (1979):
Xij =
YiYj
Y W
(
tij
ΠiPj
)1−σ
,
1as do indeed all empirical ﬁndings that build on Tinbergen's (1962) gravity speciﬁcation
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where YW is the sum of world income (or expenditure). tij denotes overall trade
barriers between the country pair ij including cultural distance or active sanctions,
and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. Πi is exporter i's outward multilateral
resistance term and Pj is importer j's inward multilateral resistance term. As
envisioned by Krugman (1995), the multilateral resistance terms capture the fact
that bilateral trade does not only depend on bilateral factors but also on trade
costs with possible third source and destination countries. Because there are many
origins and many destinations, consistent estimations must account for the relative
attractiveness of origin-destination pairs.
Eaton and Kortum (2002) provide a diﬀerent micro-foundation approach compared
to Anderson (1979) and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003): based on homogen-
eous goods on the demand side, iceberg trade costs, and Ricardian technology with
heterogeneous productivity for each country and good due to random productivity
draws, their model allows for consumption and production gains from trade. In
addition to the now existing consistency with trade theory, Feenstra (2004) and
Redding and Venables (2004) show that it is possible to capture the multilateral
resistance terms relatively easy with the inclusion of importer and exporter ﬁxed
eﬀects. This was the kick-oﬀ for a quickly growing number of empirical applica-
tions of the gravity equation in research regarding trade ﬂows, giving it the status
and recognition it has today.
In 2008, gravity was combined with the new new trade theory based on the seminal
works of Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004) on the importance of ﬁrm het-
erogeneity with respect to international trade. Prominent examples are Chaney
(2008), Helpman et al. (2008), and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Head and Mayer
(2014) popularized the term structural gravity for models that account for mul-
tilateral resistance terms and are able to show that all structural gravity models
yield the same macro-level gravity equation.
The estimation techniques of the structural gravity have evolved constantly as
well in order to further improve the validity of the results. Santos Silva and Ten-
reyro (2006) introduced the PPML estimator to estimate the gravity model. This
approach comes with several advantages over traditional OLS. PPML allows to es-
timate the gravity model in its multiplicative instead of a logarithmic form and is
therefore able to include information contained in zero trade ﬂows into the sample.
Additionally, the PPML estimator accounts for heteroscedasticity, which is often
present in trade data and potentially biases the OLS results. Moreover, it can
be used to calculate theory-consistent general equilibrium eﬀects of trade policies
(Anderson et al. (2015), Larch and Yotov (2016)). To account for endogeneity
of trade policy variables and to capture all time-invariant bilateral trade impedi-
ments, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest to include country pair ﬁxed eﬀects
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in addition to the theoretically motivated exporter-time and importer-time ﬁxed
eﬀects which control for multilateral resistance. They ﬁnd that previous estimates
of the impact of RTAs on trade that did not properly account for endogeneity are
biased downward.
In order to solve the distance puzzle popularized by Disdier and Head (2008)2,
Yotov (2012) asserts that the structural gravity only identiﬁes relative trade costs.
Therefore, studies that only use data on international trade cannot resolve the dis-
tance puzzle, because the eﬀects of distance on international trade are measured
relative to other international trade costs. Yotov (2012) recognizes the importance
of including intra-national trade ﬂows together with international trade ﬂows as
well as measures for internal and bilateral distance in the estimations. When the
eﬀects of distance and globalization are estimated relative to internal trade costs,
then the distance puzzle disappears. Bergstrand et al. (2015) combine the afore-
mentioned improvements in their econometric analysis and add a measure that
captures globalization eﬀects, such as improvements in technology and innovation.
They ﬁnd that the positive eﬀects of RTAs are smaller, compared to previous
results in the literature. This upward bias may result from not controlling for
time-varying exogenous unobservable country-pair speciﬁc changes in bilateral ex-
port costs that may decrease the cost of international relative to intra-national
trade.
In order to consistently estimate a gravity equation using PPML, a large number of
ﬁxed eﬀects is needed. For large samples, this often leads to computational issues.
Larch et al. (2017) solve this problem and provide an iterative PPML estimator
that is able to control for multilateral resistance and pair-speciﬁc heterogeneity
using ﬁxed eﬀects. This estimator additionally allows to cluster standard errors
in various ways: heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, country-pair clustered,
and multi-way clustered (see Egger and Tarlea (2015) and Cameron et al. (2011)).
In the following chapters, various speciﬁcations of the gravity equation will be used
to analyze the research questions. The preferred speciﬁcation is the state-of-the-
art PPML speciﬁcation together with intra- and international trade ﬂows, as well
as country pair ﬁxed eﬀects in addition to importer-year and exporter-year ﬁxed
eﬀects.
2In their meta analysis Disdier and Head (2008) ﬁnd that the estimated negative impact
of distance on trade has remained persistently high, even though these results are in direct
contradiction with empirical evidence of declining trade-related costs (Coe et al., 2007).
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Culture and Trade - New Evidence
from the GLOBE Data Set
3.1 Introduction
Since the fall of the iron curtain our world steadily has grown closer together. The
number of active trade agreements reach an all time high, tariﬀs are constantly
falling, and the digital revolution allows for frictionless communication as well as
for the exchange of know-how across the world. This can be interpreted as a
constant reduction of monetary trade costs and should therefore lead to a near
barrier-free ﬂow of goods across the globe. However, it has been established that
hard to observe aspects like culture have an impact on trade costs and, therefore,
on the value of trade as well. People with the same cultural background tend to
trust each other more, speak a similar language, or simply have similar institutions,
thus lowering trade costs. The striking question then is how to properly measure
cultural diﬀerences.
In this chapter I exploit the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavioral
Eﬀectiveness (GLOBE) research study of cross-cultural interactions by House et
al. (2013) to derive a proxy for cultural distance. The novel approach of the
GLOBE survey is that it speciﬁcally targets middle managers. The argument
for utilizing this survey is that cultural values of such business leaders are more
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important for trading decisions than cultural values of other members of a society.
I study the eﬀect of cultural distance on the value of trade between countries by
building a cultural distance and a cultural proximity measure using GLOBE. I ex-
tent the basic gravity equation by including these measures of bilateral cultural di-
version. To the best of my knowledge, GLOBE has never before been implemented
into a gravity framework. My preferred speciﬁcation is a pseudo-poisson maximum
likelihood (PPML) estimation which includes zero-trade and intra-national trade
ﬂows (Yotov, 2012) and a comprehensive set of ﬁxed eﬀects. In order to point out
how the results depend on the estimation method, I use standard OLS as well.
The results show that several of the nine GLOBE dimensions play a signiﬁcant
role on the value of trade when aggregating trade across all industries, some have
a positive and some have a negative inﬂuence.
To analyze if the inﬂuence of these eﬀects depends on the type of traded goods, I
make use of the product classiﬁcation by Rauch (1999). The results of the regres-
sions show that a lot of signiﬁcant eﬀects are lost due the process of aggregation.
Larger cultural distance with regard to some dimensions signiﬁcantly inﬂuences
bilateral trade especially for goods that are not traded on organized exchanges,
whereas other dimensions matter only for goods that are classiﬁed to be homogen-
eous. The same holds true for measures of cultural proximity. Furthermore, I ﬁnd
that the resulting coeﬃcients are robust to the distance measure with respect to
their level of signiﬁcance and direction but vary with the choice of the empirical
strategy.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In the next section I give a
short overview of the related literature. In section 3.3 the GLOBE research study
and its dimensions are described in detail. I then explain the indices for measuring
cultural distance and proximity, the composition of the data set, and the empirical
strategy. In sections 3.5 and 3.6 I present my results and discuss them. Finally, I
provide a short conclusion and an outlook.
3.2 Related literature
Grossman (1998) performs a simple calculation showing that the estimated negat-
ive eﬀects of bilateral distance on trade are too large to be explained by shipping
costs alone. He speculates that the reasons why distance matters so much are
cultural diﬀerences or a lack of familiarity between trade partners. Correspond-
ingly, Anderson (2011) argues that the inclusion of proxies for trade friction like
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political borders and common language improves the ﬁt of gravity estimations.
The challenge is to ﬁnd such proxies for "culture" which is notoriously hard to
measure. In the following I present some examples from the recent literature of
diﬀerent approaches and their ﬁndings.
Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) use linguistic dissimilarity as a proxy for cultural dis-
tance. They ﬁnd a negative eﬀect on international trade between 1960 and 1985
that increases from 1960 until the mid-1970s and becomes smaller afterwards.
Melitz (2008) discovers that linguistic diversity and literacy within a country pos-
itively inﬂuences foreign relative to domestic trade.
Several authors make use of the dimensions of culture introduced by Hofstede
(2001) and Hofstede et al. (2010). In these studies, cultural dimensions include in-
dividualism versus collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, masculinity
versus femininity, and long term orientation. Linders et al. (2005) ﬁnd a posit-
ive eﬀect of cultural distance on bilateral trade. They explain this ﬁnding by
arguing that ﬁrms prefer trade to host-country production in culturally distant
countries. Using the same cultural dimensions, Lankhuizen and de Groot (2016)
ﬁnd a non-linear relationship between cultural distance and international trade:
Cultural distance decreases trade only after a certain threshold is reached, while it
has a positive impact on trade below this threshold. Gorodnichenko et al. (2017)
provide evidence that the higher the cultural distance between cooperating part-
ners, the smaller is the chance of a ﬁrm to be integrated by a foreign company.
Using the 2009 Greek debt crisis as a case study, Guiso et al. (2016) argue that
cultural diﬀerences between countries can lead to a political impasse, making it
diﬃcult to reach an optimal outcome.
The World Values Survey (WVS), an international survey undertaken in almost
100 countries over the last 30 years, provides another way to derive proxies for
cultural distance. Cyrus (2015) ﬁnds that the cultural distance measure derived
from the WVS has no eﬀect on the value of bilateral trade but she ﬁnds evidence
that increasing trade reduces cultural distance. I believe that reverse causality is
not an issue for my analyses of trade eﬀects of cultural distance in chapters 3 and
4, since my measures for cultural distance do not vary over time.1 Coyne and Wil-
liamson (2012) discover that increasing openness to trade has a positive eﬀect on
culture supporting economic interaction and entrepreneurship, namely trust, per-
ceived level of self-determination, respect for others, and obedience. Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2016) show that genetic distance is positively correlated with cultural
distance based on results from the WVS. They additionally provide a compelling
data base for several measures of distance. It includes measures of genetic distance
1Moreover, I apply a battery of ﬁxed eﬀects, as suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2007).
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between countries as well as linguistic, religious, and cultural diﬀerences.
Guiso et al. (2009) use a trust-index based on views of European managers. They
link higher trust-ratings to higher trade between country pairs, higher foreign dir-
ect investment (FDI), and higher portfolio investments as well. Lien and Lo (2017)
ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on both, trade and FDI, from the establishment of
cultural institutions abroad like the German Goethe-Insitute which promote lan-
guage and culture of a country. Using the Eurovision Song Contest to construct a
measure for cultural proximity, Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) ﬁnd that trade in
diﬀerentiated goods is aﬀected positively by cultural proximity.
3.3 Cultural distance dimensions
While the WVS relies on interviews with 1,000 randomly chosen people per coun-
try, the GLOBE research program by House et al. (2013) collects data speciﬁcally
from middle managers from 951 organizations from the sectors ﬁnancial services,
food processing, and telecommunications across 60 diﬀerent cultures between 1994
and 1997. The same three sectors are present in all countries across the survey and
their setup is quite similar across countries but each one is fundamentally diﬀerent
compared to the other two. Even though the sample size of the GLOBE survey
is smaller than, e.g., the WVS it may still be a relevant alternative to measure
cultural distance. The argument is that cultural believes of business leaders are
actually more important for international trade than the believes of the remaining
population, as these managers actually have the power to inﬂuence the decision
whether or not to trade with partners across borders. I add to the literature as
this group of people may share cultural views that fundamentally diﬀer from the
rest of the population.
The GLOBE research program builds on the cultural dimensions introduced by
Hofstede (2001) and Hofstede et al. (2010) but implements additional dimensions.
The survey identiﬁes nine cultural dimensions that are potentially important when
analyzing an international business partner. In the following I will introduce each
of these dimensions in detail.
Performance orientation reﬂects the extent to which a society encourages and re-
wards innovation and improvement of its members. The overall goal is to achieve
and maintain high standards. Countries with a high score regarding performance
orientation set a focus on education and learning, emphasize on getting results,
set high performance targets, value taking initiative, and prefer explicit and direct
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communication. This holds especially true for countries like Switzerland, Singa-
pore, or Albania. Low performance oriented countries like Russia, Venezuela, or
Greece tend to disapprove of overly ambitious behavior, have a low sense of ur-
gency, and pay special attention to age instead of performance when it comes to
promotions.
Assertiveness reﬂects the degree to which members belonging to a society are ﬁrm,
tough, dominant, and aggressive in social relationships. Countries like Albania,
Nigeria, and Hungary score high on assertiveness and, therefore, tend to value and
reward competition, success, and direct communication. Low assertiveness-score
countries like Japan, New Zealand, and Sweden place higher value in cooperation
and equality.
Uncertainty avoidance mirrors the extend to which members of a society seek order,
consistency, structure, formalized procedures, and laws to cover situations in their
daily lives. Countries with high uncertainty avoidance-score, like Switzerland,
Sweden, and Singapore, set very high stakes in formal interactions including legal
contracts and meticulous record-keeping, apply much more calculating when taking
risk, and are more resistant to change. The bottom end of the list features countries
like Guatemala, Hungary, and Russia.
Power distance reﬂects the degree to which members of a society accept and ap-
prove that power should be shared unevenly. Firms in countries with high a
power-distance-score therefore exhibit a distinct hierarchy or chain of command.
Countries with the highest power distance are Morocco, Nigeria, and El Salvador,
while the Netherlands, Denmark, or the Czech Republic seem to believe in ﬂat
hierarchies.
In-group collectivism can be interpreted whether children take pride in the indi-
vidual accomplishments of their parents and vice versa, whether parents tend to
live at home with their children when they get older, and whether children live
at home with their parents until they get married. Examples for countries which
score high regarding in-group collectivism are the Philippines, Iran, or India. In
countries like Sweden, Denmark, and the Czech Republic this does not seem to be
the case.
Institutional collectivism measures the degree to which ﬁrms and societal institu-
tional practices encourage and reward collective action and collective distribution
of resources. Employers in countries with a high institutional-collectivism-score
tend to develop long-term relationships with their employees. Employees identify
with their ﬁrm and make personal sacriﬁces to fulﬁll organizational obligations.
Countries with the highest score of institutional collectivism are South Korea,
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Sweden, and Japan, whereas the scores of Hungary, Greece, and the Czech Re-
public indicate a more individualistic attitude.
Future orientation mirrors the extent to which members of a society believe that
their current actions will inﬂuence their future. They focus on investments regard-
ing their future, believe in planning for developing their future, and look far into
the future for assessing the eﬀects of their current actions. Countries with high fu-
ture orientation-score like Singapore, Switzerland, or the Netherlands are inclined
to save for the future, have more intrinsically motivated individuals and achieve
greater economics success. Countries that set a low value in future orientation
tend to place higher priorities on immediate gratiﬁcation and rewards and take a
shorter strategic view. Poland, Argentina, and Russia are examples for countries
characterized by the latter.
Humane orientation reﬂects the degree to which a society encourages and rewards
its members for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others.
Countries like Malaysia, Philippines, and Ireland emit a high humane-orientation-
score. On the other side of the scale are Greece, Spain, or France.
Gender egalitarianism is a measure for the ways in which societies divide roles
between women and men. The more gender egalitarian a society is, the less it
relies on biology to determine the social roles of women and men. Countries that
score higher on gender egalitarianism tend to have similar levels of education for
men and women and more women in positions in authority. This seems to be
the case in countries like Russia, Hungary, or Poland, while countries like Egypt,
Morocco, or South Korea are on the other side of the scale. In those countries
women exhibit a lower status in the society, the literacy rate for women is lower
than for men, and fewer women are part of the labor force.
Table 3.A.1 in the appendix presents details of the individual rank of each country
within the GLOBE survey for all nine cultural dimensions.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the nine GLOBE indicators. The ques-
tionnaire allows answers to take discrete values between 1 and 7. The mean ranges
from 3.371 to 5.16 and the standard deviations from 0.345 to 0.6972. The means
of the diﬀerent indices do not diﬀer much, the standard deviations, however, do.
This means that the nine dimensions should be indeed viewed individually since
they carry diﬀerent information. It is interesting to note that the measures for
in-group collectivism and institutional collectivism are quite diﬀerent with regard
to their mean and standard deviation, pointing towards the fact that the distinc-
2For a detailed illustration on how the survey is executed and where the numbers result from,
see House et al. (2013), Part III and IV.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of GLOBE dimensions
Mean Std. dev.
1. Performance orientation 4.076 0.388
2. Assertiveness 4.136 0.345
3. Uncertainty avoidance 4.131 0.578
4. Power distance 5.158 0.379
5. In-group collectivism 5.160 0.694
6. Institutional collectivism 4.259 0.406
7. Future orientation 3.825 0.448
8. Humane orientation 4.092 0.452
9. Gender egalitarianism 3.371 0.354
tion made by House et al. (2013) oﬀers new insights. The fact that countries like
Sweden assign a high value to institutional collectivism but prefer individualism
to in-group collectivism supports this.
3.4 Data and estimation strategy
The GLOBE indicators listed above stem from House et al. (2013). To generate
a measure of cultural distance from the unilateral GLOBE dimensions I compute
the absolute value of the diﬀerence between any two countries i and j for each of
the nine culture dimensions:
cult_distij =
|(cult_dimensioni − cult_dimensionj)|
max(cult_dimension)−min(cult_dimension)
In order to scale the data to be between zero and unity, the cultural distance per
country pair is divided by the maximum distance of each dimension. Since the
questionnaire allows answers to vary between 1 and 7, the scaling parameter is
6. The drawback of this measure is that after log-linearizing the gravity equa-
tion, country pairs with zero distance are omitted. Furthermore, this makes it
impossible to include intra-national trade. To allow for this, I create another
measure called cultural proximity for each of the nine dimensions. Here, maximal
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proximity takes the value of 1 and the more the countries' views diﬀer, the closer
the measure moves to zero. To make sure that the term between zero and unity,
I apply the same scaling procedure as for the distance measure.
cult_proxij = 1− |(cult_dimensioni − cult_dimensionj)|
max(cult_dimension)−min(cult_dimension)
Additional data used for the econometric analysis is derived from the Centre
d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). Bilateral export
data on the 6-digit industry level originally stem from the United Nations Com-
modity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) and are provided by CEPII's
Base Analytique du Commerce International (BACI) for years after 1995 (Gaulier
& Zignago, 2010). I follow the proposition of Yotov (2012) and do not just include
international but intra-national trade ﬂows as well. Additionally, this ensures the-
ory consistent estimators of bilateral trade policy (Dai et al., 2014) and allows to
capture the eﬀect of globalization on international trade (Bergstrand et al., 2015).
Information about intra-national trade at the 3-digit industry level is taken from
the Trade, Production and Bilateral Protection (TradeProd) data base by CEPII
(de Sousa et al., 2012). TradeProd is available for over 150 countries for the period
from 1980 to 2006. Other controls like information on regional trade agreements
(RTAs), bilateral distance, contiguity, colonial background, and common currency
come from CEPII's Gravity (Head et al. (2010) and Head and Mayer (2014)).
I allow for the possibility that cultural distance potentially inﬂuences some goods
diﬀerently and follow the commodity groups classiﬁcation provided by Rauch
(1999). He distinguishes between three categories: products that are traded on an
organized exchange, products whose prices are listed in trade publications, and all
other products. I combine the former two categories into one called homogeneous
goods, while referring to the latter as diﬀerentiated goods.
I expect that cultural distance matters more for diﬀerentiated goods than for
homogenous goods. The trade value for the latter should not depend on the
country of origin or which cultural values a trading partner displays, since these
goods are very similar anywhere around the world. Diﬀerentiated goods, however,
may strongly depend on a culture's bias and its preferences.
I estimate the cross-section for the year 1995, a year for which data is available for
a maximum of countries. The sample includes seven African countries, 12 countries
from America, 15 from Asia, 18 from Europe, and four from the Middle East. The
ﬁnal data set contains about 3,000 country-pair observations. I provide summary
statistics in Table 3.2. 61 pairs have a common currency, 96 have a common
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of cultural distance data set
Total number of pairs with common currency 61
Total number of pairs with colonial background 96
Total number of pairs with common border 98
Total number of RTAs 316
Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Perf. Orient. dist. 0 0.327 0.077 0.059
Uncert. Avoid. dist. 0 0.388 0.107 0.085
Power dist. 0 0.428 0.074 0.065
In-Group Coll. dist. 0 0.485 0.124 0.106
Institutional Coll. dist. 0 0.308 0.074 0.065
Assertiveness dist. 0 0.218 0.065 0.046
Fut. Orient. dist. 0 0.377 0.088 0.070
Humane Orient. dist. 0 0.333 0.088 0.066
Gender Egal. dist. 0 0.333 0.070 0.059
Av. cultural dist. 0 0.211 0.085 0.037
Perf. Orient. prox. 0.673 1 0.923 0.059
Uncert. Avoid. prox. 0.612 1 0.893 0.085
Power dist. 0.572 1 0.926 0.065
In-Group Coll. prox. 0.515 1 0.876 0.106
Institutional Coll. prox. 0.692 1 0.926 0.059
Assertiveness prox. 0.782 1 0.935 0.046
Fut. Orient. prox. 0.623 1 0.912 0.070
Humane Orient. prox. 0.667 1 0.912 0.066
Gender Egal. prox. 0.667 1 0.930 0.054
Av. cultural prox. 0.789 1 0.915 0.037
Distance (in km) 9.56 19,650.13 7930.18 4695.57
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colonial background, and 98 share a border. Overall, there is a total of 316 active
RTAs. The table also indicates minimum and maximum values as well as the mean
and standard deviation of the distance and proximity measures computed with the
methods described above. The average cultural distance measure is computed by
taking the average across all nine dimensions per country pair.
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation of the gravity equation is estimated using OLS:
ln(Xij) = β1cult_distij+β2RTAij+β3RTAij,t−5+GRAV ITY ′ij ∗β+µi+λj+ij
(3.1)
Here, Xij denotes the value of exports from exporter i to importer j. The meas-
ure for each bilateral cultural distance (and proximity) dimension is given by
cult_distij (cult_proxij). Additionally, speciﬁcation (3.1) captures active RTAs
via the dummy RTAij, together with a 5 year lag. This allows for time-varying
or non-linear eﬀects of RTAs. The vector GRAV ITYij includes the log of bilat-
eral distance and time-invariant dummy variables like common border, common
currency, and colonial background. In addition, it includes a dummy that controls
for unobservable globalization eﬀects (Bergstrand et al., 2015). It takes the value
of unity if international trade occurs, and is zero otherwise. To account for unob-
servable country-speciﬁc variables, exporter and importer ﬁxed eﬀects denoted by
µi and λj are included. ij denotes the error term.
Speciﬁcation (3.2) yields the PPML estimation approach. It was ﬁrst proposed by
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and has several advantages over the traditional
OLS. First, the PPML makes use of the multiplicative instead of the logarithmic
form of the gravity model. Therefore, it is possible to include observations with
zero trade. Second, in the presence of heteroscedasticity the log-linear form of
the OLS estimation potentially leads to biased and inconsistent estimators. The
PPML performs well under these circumstances. The explanatory variables are
the same as in the OLS estimation above.
Xij = exp[β1cult_distij+β2RTAij+β3RTAij,t−5+GRAV ITY ′ij ∗β+µi+λj]∗ij
(3.2)
3.5 Cultural distance estimation results
In this section I provide the results of the estimation speciﬁcations. Columns (1)
to (9) of the following tables consider the cultural dimensions individually, while
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column (10) contains the eﬀect of the average of all nine dimensions. The depend-
ent variable in panel A is the aggregate bilateral trade value, panel B analyzes
the eﬀects of culture on the export value of homogeneous goods, whereas panel C
focuses on the trade value of diﬀerentiated goods only. All speciﬁcations include
importer ﬁxed eﬀects and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered at
the country-pair level. For the sake of readability, I display only the variables of
interest. In appendix 3.A, I report the complete regression outputs.
Tables 3.3 to 3.5 present the results of the cross-section estimations featuring
the measure of cultural distance in logs. In Table 3.3, the results for the OLS
estimations are given. To allow for comparison, Table 3.4 re-estimates the same
sample using PPML instead of OLS. Table 3.5 increases the sample size of the
previous PPML estimation by including zero trade ﬂows. In order to exploit the
whole sample, the cultural distance eﬀects are then estimated in levels instead
of logs in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7. To allow for a comparison with the previous
ﬁndings, Table 3.6 shows the results without the inclusion of intra-national trade
, the regressions in Table 3.7 utilize the full sample.
Diﬀerences in uncertainty avoidance and institutional collectivism seem to inﬂu-
ence the value of overall exports signiﬁcantly and negatively in panel A of Table
3.3. A 1 percent increase in the distance regarding uncertainty avoidance translates
to a -0.05 percent decrease in export value at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
A 1 percent increase in bilateral diﬀerences with regard to institutional collect-
ivism leads to decline of -0.076 percent in the value of exports at the 5 percent
level of signiﬁcance. The sample size varies because some countries they share
identical values. As their cultural distance is zero, they are dropped due to the
log-linearization.
When focusing on trade with homogenous goods only in panel B, the coeﬃcient
for institutional collectivism stays signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level with an average
negative impact of -0.067 percent. Gender egalitarianism returns with a statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level. If the distance between a country pair increases
by 1 percent with respect to this dimension, trade value is reduced by -0.092
percent.
In panel C the sample exclusively covers exports of diﬀerentiated goods. A 1
percent increase in the diﬀerence of uncertainty avoidance reduces the value of
exports by -0.076 percent. This eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant. If the perception of
hierarchy within a society, measured by power distance, diverges by 1 percent, this
reduces trade on average by -0.079 percent at the 1 percent level of signiﬁcance.
The coeﬃcient of institutional collectivism returns statistically signiﬁcant at 5
percent and negative with the magnitude of -0.066.
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When comparing the results of the three OLS estimations in Table 3.3 it becomes
apparent that it makes a big diﬀerence, which goods speciﬁcation is used. Several
parameters are rendered insigniﬁcant by the aggregation, while some eﬀects are
only driven by either the homogeneous or diﬀerentiated goods speciﬁcation. Out
of the ten distance variables of interest, only the coeﬃcient for institutional collect-
ivism aﬀects exports across speciﬁcations similarly in size and level of signiﬁcance.
It measures collaboration of resources and actions within a ﬁrm as well as loyalty.
Employees with a high sense of institutional collectivism may have problems see-
ing eye to eye with ﬁrms that encourage individual performances and, therefore,
competition. Uncertainty avoidance is a mirror to which extent a society seeks
structure, formalized procedures, and laws. Thus, it is understandable why large
diﬀerences regarding this parameter can make negotiations more diﬃcult, espe-
cially with goods not traded on an organized exchange. This negative eﬀect is
still active in the aggregate. Big diﬀerences regarding the acceptance of women
as equal partners can make negotiations with parties from certain cultural beliefs
harder. However, the negative eﬀect of diﬀerences in gender egalitarianism only
seems to matter for homogeneous goods and vanishes in the aggregate.
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 show the results for the cross section estimation using
PPML. First, the OLS sample is re-estimated via PPML, and afterwards the full
sample is used. The structure of the tables follow Table 3.3. TheR2 is calculated by
computing the square of the correlation between trade and ﬁtted values following
the method described by Tenreyro.3
After re-estimating the OLS sample with PPML in Table 3.4 four of the distance
variables of interest return statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the aggregate
level of exports in panel A. If the perception of power distance between two coun-
tries grows apart by 1 percent, international trade decreases by -0.067 percent.
The coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Growing diﬀer-
ences in in-group collectivism lead to a highly signiﬁcant increase in the export
value by -0.09 percent. Diﬀerent mindsets regarding future orientation decrease
average trade value by -0.056 percent with critical values of 1 percent. The ﬁnal
statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient at the 5 percent level is gender egalitarianism
with -0.048.
Like the OLS regression above, the sample is once again split between exports of
homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods following Rauch (1999). Panel B displays
the homogeneous speciﬁcation. A 1 percent increase in the bilateral distance of
uncertainty avoidance decreases trade by -0.048 percent. The coeﬃcient of in-group
collectivism returns positive with 0.064. Growing distance regarding institutional
3See http://personal.lse.ac.uk/tenreyro/r2.do for details.
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collectivism increases trade in homogeneous goods by 0.092 percent. The coeﬃcient
of humane orientation is -0.053. All coeﬃcients above are statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level. Gender egalitarianism is signiﬁcant at 5 percent and decreases
the value of trade by -0.053 percent if this distance measure increases by 1 percent.
Panel C of Table 3.4 features exports of diﬀerentiated goods as dependent variable.
The same coeﬃcients return signiﬁcantly as in the full sample speciﬁcation A.
Power distance is highly signiﬁcant at 0.1 percent, with a negative impact on
trade of -0.095. The coeﬃcient measuring distance via in-group collectivism is
highly signiﬁcant as well. The value of exports for diﬀerentiated goods increases
by 0.114 percent on average if bilateral cultural distance increases by 1 percent.
A negative trade eﬀect of -0.059 percent is estimated for the measure of future
orientation, at a critical value of 1 percent. The export value of diﬀerentiated
goods drops by -0.049 percent if views regarding gender egalitarianism grow apart
by 1 percent. This coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
The PPML estimations in Table 3.5 include country pairs with zero trade. As a
result, the sample size increases by around 200 observations. In panel A, in-group
collectivism returns highly signiﬁcant with a coeﬃcient of 0.09. The coeﬃcient for
power distance is given by -0.068 and the one for future orientation is given by
-0.055, both at 1 percent level of signiﬁcance. Gender egalitarianism yields -0.048
at 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
The distance dimension of uncertainty avoidance has a negative eﬀect on bilateral
trade with homogeneous goods in panel B of -0.048. Increasing distance regarding
in-group collectivism seems to have a positive inﬂuence on bilateral trade of 0.066
percent. So does the coeﬃcient of institutional collectivism with 0.091. If values
regarding humane orientation grow apart by 1 percent, this decreases trade by
-0.054 percent. All four dimensions are statistically signiﬁcant at 1 percent. A 1
percent decrease in bilateral perception of gender egalitarianism decreases average
export value by -0.053 percent at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
Panel C once again focuses on exports of diﬀerentiated goods. The coeﬃcients of
power distance and in-group collectivism return highly signiﬁcantly, with -0.095
and 0.114, respectively. The measure of future orientation returns with -0.059 at 1
percent level of signiﬁcance. Gender egalitarianism is given by -0.049 with critical
values of 5 percent.
The results of the PPML estimations in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 are nearly identical.
Both show that the eﬀects of the distance variables of interest power distance and
future orientation in the aggregate estimation of panel A are driven by the diﬀer-
entiated goods speciﬁcation in panel C alone. A possible reason for the signiﬁcant
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negative eﬀect of future orientation may be that it is important for successful ne-
gotiations of diﬀerentiated goods that trade partners share a similar strategic view
that depends on the focus on immediate or future rewards. In-group collectivism
and gender egalitarianism are signiﬁcant across all speciﬁcations. Diﬀerent per-
ceptions regarding collectivism seem to inﬂuence trade positively. It is interesting
to note that diﬀerences with regard to in-group collectivism has a positive and per-
sistent eﬀect of across all three speciﬁcations points, while distance concerning the
measure for institutional collectivism only seems to inﬂuence homogeneous trade.
Likewise, the coeﬃcients for uncertainty avoidance and humane orientation are
signiﬁcant for trade with homogeneous goods only.
When comparing Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 it becomes apparent that the method of
estimation greatly inﬂuences the results. Only three coeﬃcients share signiﬁcance
across the three estimation strategies and only two of them have the same sign.
Furthermore, it is important to note that trough the process of aggregation a lot
of signiﬁcant information is lost.
In Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 the distance measures enter the estimations in levels,
not in logs. This allows to include previously omitted country pairs which share
identical cultural believes. Moreover, it allows for the inclusion of intra-national
trade as was proposed by Yotov (2012). Since cultural distance within the same
country is zero by deﬁnition, the process of log-linearizing drops them out of the
regressions. In order to compare the results of the level-estimation with the log-
estimation in Table 3.5, Table 3.6 does not include intra-national trade.
In panel A of Table 3.6, the coeﬃcients for power distance, future orientation,
and gender egalitarianism aﬀect trade negatively, whereas distance in in-group
collectivism positively inﬂuences trade in aggregate goods. These ﬁndings are
identical to the ones in Table 3.5.
In panel B, humane orientation and gender egalitarianism exhibit a negative, in-
group collectivism and institutional collectivism a positive impact on trade. All four
are statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient for uncertainty avoidance is statistically
insigniﬁcant in contrast to Table 3.5.
The four distance measures that aﬀect trade statistically signiﬁcant for diﬀerenti-
ated goods in panel C in Table 3.5 appear in Table 3.6 as well: Power distance,
future orientation, and gender egalitarianism with a negative sign, in-group col-
lectivism with a positive sign. The coeﬃcient for assertiveness is positive and
is only statistically signiﬁcant in levels, not in logs. Overall, however, it does not
seem to matter much, if the distance measures are included in level- or in log-form.
The results change dramatically if intra-national trade is included, as Table 3.7
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demonstrates. The coeﬃcients of ﬁve out the ten columns return signiﬁcant. In-
creasing distance in the measures for performance orientation, future orientation,
and gender egalitarianism inﬂuence trade negatively with a shared critical value of
0.1 percent. Their respective coeﬃcients are -2.533, -2.813, and -6.006. Distance in
assertiveness has a positive impact on trade of 2.486, whereas the average distance
measure has a negative impact of -3.255, both at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
Two distance dimensions inﬂuence exports of homogeneous goods in panel B posit-
ively, power distance with a coeﬃcient of 2.593 and institutional collectivism with
a coeﬃcient of 2.310. The former has a critical value of 1 percent and the latter of
5 percent. Growing distance regarding future orientation decreases trade by -2.638
at the 1 percent level of signiﬁcance. The coeﬃcient for gender egalitarianism is
-6.098 and highly signiﬁcant.
Panel C focuses on exports of diﬀerentiated goods. Six cultural distance measures
return negatively and signiﬁcantly. The coeﬃcient of performance orientation
decreases trade by -3.396, the one of future orientation by -2.553, and the one of
gender egalitarianism by 5.522. These positive eﬀects are signiﬁcant at a critical
value of 0.01. The coeﬃcient for the dimension assertiveness is 2.939 and the
one for average proximity is -3.960, both at a critical value of 0.01. Uncertainty
avoidance returns with -1.164 at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.4
3.6 Cultural proximity estimation results
In order to allow for country pairs to share identical values with regard to some
of the cultural dimensions I make use of the proximity rather than the distance
measure. When using the proximity measure, identical cultural views are reﬂec-
ted by values of unity. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show the output for the cross-section
estimation of the inﬂuence of cultural proximity on trade using OLS, Tables 3.10
and 3.11 provide results of the PPML regressions.
Like in the previous regressions focusing on cultural distance, the nine proximity
measures are included individually in columns (1) to (9) to see, which potentially
inﬂuence the value of trade. The ﬁnal column exhibits the average proximity eﬀect
of all nine dimensions. I use aggregated export value as dependent variable ﬁrst
and then distinguish between exports of homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods.
Importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects are included as well as traditional gravity con-
4If the regressions are repeated using the unscaled distance measures, the magnitude of all
coeﬃcients is divided by 6.
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trols for distance, RTAs, contiguity, common currency, and colonial background.
Standard errors are robust and clustered on the country pair level.
To allow for a comparison with the set of distance regressions, the ﬁrst proximity
OLS estimation does not take intra-national trade into account and can be found in
Table 3.8. Two out of the nine proximity measures in panel A signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
aggregate exports. At the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance the coeﬃcient for in-group
collectivism yields that on average a 1 percent increase in the proximity leads to
a -0.514 percent decrease of export value. On the other hand, the coeﬃcient for
institutional collectivism indicates that if country pairs grow closer by 1 percent
with regard to this culture indicator, exports increase by 1.053 percent at 5 percent
level of signiﬁcance. The other proximity coeﬃcients seem to play no signiﬁcant
role for exports on the aggregate.
When splitting the sample into homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods, the OLS
regression in panel B yields no signiﬁcant eﬀect for any of the cultural proximity
dimensions on trade with homogeneous goods.
For diﬀerentiated goods, closer cultural vicinity regarding performance orientation
increases trade by 1.403 percent and is highly signiﬁcant in panel C. The same sig-
niﬁcance is attributed to the measure of uncertainty avoidance. Growing closer
with respect to this dimension has a positive eﬀect on exports by 1.007. Trade
with countries that share more similar views with regard to in-group collectivism
decreases on average by -0.652 percent with a critical value of 5 percent. A 1
percent increase in bilateral proximity of institutional collectivism and future ori-
entation increases trade by 1.056 percent and 0.728 percent, respectively. Both
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
When comparing the OLS results of Tables 3.3 and 3.8 it becomes apparent that
the results are quite diﬀerent. Only institutional collectivism is persistent for the
aggregate goods case, uncertainty avoidance and in-group collectivism are only sig-
niﬁcant in one of the two speciﬁcations. In panel B, the two signiﬁcant measures in
the distance OLS estimation become insigniﬁcant after using the proximity meas-
ure. Uncertainty avoidance and institutional collectivism inﬂuence trade similarly
across both estimations for the diﬀerentiated goods case. However, power distance
is signiﬁcant when used as a distance measure, whereas performance orientation,
in-group collectivism, and future orientation seem only to matter when using the
proximity speciﬁcation.
Table 3.9 presents the results of the OLS cross-section estimation with cultural
proximity and includes intra-national trade data. All gravity controls as well as
importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects are included. Out of the nine measures for
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3.6. CULTURAL PROXIMITY ESTIMATION RESULTS
cultural proximity in panel A, one returns signiﬁcantly at the 1 percent level. If
a country pair grows closer together by 1 percent regarding in-group collectivism,
aggregate exports decrease on average by -0.731 percent.
In the next two panels the sample is once again split into diﬀerent goods categories.
As can be seen in panel B, none of the proximity dimensions inﬂuence exports of
homogeneous goods signiﬁcantly.
For trade with diﬀerentiated goods in panel C a proximity increase of 1 percent
leads to a rise of exports by 1.239 and 0.720 percent with respect to performance
orientation and uncertainty avoidance, respectively. The coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
at critical values of 5 percent. Increasing proximity with regard to the cultural
dimension in-group collectivism inﬂuences trade negatively. A 1 percent increase
of proximity decreases trade by -0.896 percent at 0.1 percent level of signiﬁcance.
Comparing the proximity results from Tables 3.8 and 3.9, the proximity measure
in-group collectivism appears to be robust whether or not intra-national trade
is included. The same holds true for the measures performance orientation and
uncertainty avoidance. They remain comparable in size, even though the level of
signiﬁcance varies due to slight changes in the standard errors: The coeﬃcients of
institutional collectivism and future orientation lose their signiﬁcance when intra-
national trade is included into the estimation. Trade with homogeneous goods
remains unaﬀected by the proximity dimensions.
To make the results comparable with the previous OLS regression, the PPML
estimation in Table 3.10 includes intra-national trade but no zero trade ﬂows. The
ﬁndings in Table 3.11 cover the whole sample.
When aggregating all exports per country pair, ﬁve of the proximity variables
of interest return statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in panel A of Table 3.10,
including average proximity. If the perception of performance orientation between
two countries grows closer together, international trade increases by 2.962. The
coeﬃcient is highly statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 percent level. Increasing
proximity with regard to assertiveness leads to a decrease in the export value by
-2.114 percent. The coeﬃcient for uncertainty avoidance is given by 1.31. Both
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Similar mindsets regarding future
orientation increase average trade value highly signiﬁcantly by 2.995. Likewise, the
coeﬃcient for gender egalitarianism is highly signiﬁcant with 5.627. The coeﬃcient
for the eﬀect of average proximity is 4.386 and highly signiﬁcant as well.
The sample is once again split between exports of homogeneous and diﬀerentiated
goods. Panel B shows the homogeneous speciﬁcation. A 1 percent increase in the
bilateral proximity of performance orientation leads to a highly signiﬁcant increase
34
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3.6. CULTURAL PROXIMITY ESTIMATION RESULTS
in trade by 2.466 percent. The coeﬃcient of power distance returns negative with
-1.898 at a critical value of 5 percent. Growing proximity regarding institutional
collectivism decreases trade in homogeneous goods by -2.685 percent. If countries
improve their similarity with respect to future orientation by 1 percent, average
exports are expected to grow by 3.321. The coeﬃcient for gender egalitarianism
is 4.980. All three coeﬃcients above are statistically signiﬁcant at critical values
of 0.01.
Panel C of Table 3.10 features exports of diﬀerentiated goods as dependent vari-
able. The coeﬃcient for performance orientation is highly signiﬁcant at 0.1 per-
cent, with a positive impact on bilateral trade of 3.563. The value of exports for
diﬀerentiated goods decreases by -2.567 percent on average if bilateral cultural
proximity measured by assertiveness increases by 1 percent. The coeﬃcient is
signiﬁcant at 5 percent. The same level of signiﬁcance holds for the following two
dimensions. Similar views concerning uncertainty avoidance lead to an increase
in exports by 1.093 percent. A positive trade eﬀect of 1.739 percent is estimated
for the measure of power distance. If cultural proximity grows by 1 percent, the
export value of diﬀerentiated goods increases on average by 2.617 percent with
regard to future orientation, by 5 percent with respect to gender egalitarianism,
and by 4.605 percent for the measure of average proximity. The three dimensions
are highly signiﬁcant at critical values of 0.001.
The choice of estimation method has a big impact on the results of the regression.
When re-estimating the OLS-sample using PPML, only two proximity measures
overlap with respect to their level of signiﬁcance and the general direction of the
coeﬃcient and even then the actual size of the eﬀect varies greatly.
The estimations in Table 3.11 make use of the whole sample. In ﬁve out of the
ten columns, the proximity measures have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the value of
aggregate exports in panel A. The coeﬃcient for performance orientation is given
by 2.316 and is highly signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients for future orientation given by
2.502 and for gender egalitarianism given by 5.455 are highly signiﬁcant as well.
The measure for proximity regarding assertiveness and the average proximity share
a level of signiﬁcance of 5 percent. Increasing proximity by 1 percent decreases
trade by -2.319 percent with respect to assertiveness. Average proximity has a
positive eﬀect on trade with a coeﬃcient of 2.961.
Panel B yields the results for exports of homogeneous goods. If the trade part-
ners share similar views with respect to gender egalitarianism, the value of trade
increases by 5.497 at the 0.1 percent level of signiﬁcance. Two proximity measures
return at critical values of 0.01: If similar perception regarding power distance
increases by 1 percent, average exports fall by -2.387 percent. In contrast to that,
36
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3.7. CONCLUSION
the coeﬃcient of future orientation is 2.323. Trade is decreased by -2.041 percent
if proximity regarding institutional collectivism increases by 1 percent at the 5
percent level of signiﬁcance.
Five out of nine proximity measures and the average proximity inﬂuence trade
with diﬀerentiated goods signiﬁcantly in panel C. Performance orientation, future
orientation, and gender egalitarianism share a 0.1 percent level of signiﬁcance.
The ﬁrst measure returns with 3.141, the second with 2.282, and the third with
5.052. If proximity increases by 1 percent regarding the dimension of assertiveness,
exports decrease by 2.709 percent, while they increase by 3.631 percent with regard
to the average proximity measure. Both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
At a critical value of 5 percent similar views regarding uncertainty avoidance have
a positive eﬀect on trade of 1.005.
The sample size of the full sample PPML is larger by around 300 observations
compared to the PPML without zero trade ﬂows. This changes the results some-
what. For the aggregate goods case in panel A, the coeﬃcients become smaller but
remain comparable to the PPML with strictly positive trade ﬂows with respect to
magnitude of their impact. The same ﬁve coeﬃcients return signiﬁcantly in both
estimations, except for humane orientation, which only appears signiﬁcantly in
the full sample estimation. A similar observation can be made for panel B. Four
coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant in both estimations even though the level of signiﬁc-
ance varies. Performance orientation loses its signiﬁcance in the full sample. The
increase in sample size leads to more variation for diﬀerentiated goods in panel
C. Power distance does not inﬂuence trade any more if zero-trade ﬂows are in-
cluded. The other coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant and comparable in size. When
comparing the results of Table 3.7 and Table 3.11, the results of the two full-sample
estimations appear to be robust with regard to their level of signiﬁcance. The spe-
ciﬁcation choice does not seem to matter if intra-national trade is accounted for.
However, the magnitude of the eﬀects is more plausible in logs than in levels.
3.7 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to shed more light on the eﬀect of diﬀerent cultural
beliefs across countries on trade using the nine cultural dimensions of GLOBE.
To quantify bilateral cultural diversion, I introduced two speciﬁcations: A dis-
tance measure and a proximity measure. Two diﬀerent estimation strategies have
been applied to the cross-section, OLS and PPML together with several diﬀerent
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speciﬁcations of the data set. Since the OLS method has several drawbacks, the
PPML is the preferred estimation strategy. In addition, it allows to include zero
trade ﬂows and, therefore, to utilize the whole data set. To allow cultural aspects
to aﬀect diﬀerent goods diﬀerently, the goods classiﬁcation of Rauch (1999) has
been applied.
The resulting picture is very rich. Several cultural aspects have a positive eﬀect
on trade, while others inﬂuence trade negatively. This is surprising and highlights
the importance of understanding what exactly the variable measures. The results
are quite robust for the two measures but whether cultural (dis-)similarity aﬀects
trade positively, negatively, or not at all depends on the estimation method.
As expected, several cultural aspects on the aggregate are driven by trade with
diﬀerentiated goods, however, homogeneous goods are inﬂuenced by some cultural
dimensions, that do not matter for the diﬀerentiated goods case. Therefore, the
importance of cultural aspects varies with the type of good and some eﬀects are
lost when using the aggregate only. Finally, it does not seem to matter for the sign
and the level of signiﬁcance if the cultural dimensions enter the structural gravity
equation in logs or in levels.
For further research the issue of potential endogeneity within cross-sectional estim-
ations should be addressed by making use of a panel framework. This would allow
to properly account for multilateral resistance by including country-pair ﬁxed ef-
fects as proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and lead to unbiased and more
plausible estimators.
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3.A Additional tables
Table 3.A.1 yields the individual rank of each of the 60 countries within the
GLOBE survey for each of the nine cultural dimensions. The rank of 1 corres-
ponds to the lowest score in the sample and 60 to the highest.
Tables 3.A.2 to 3.A.28 yield the complete regression outputs except for the ﬁxed
eﬀects dummies. All speciﬁcations include importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects.
The additional gravity controls include common measures for bilateral distance,
dummies for RTAs and 5-year lags of RTAs, contiguity, common currency, and
colonial ties. Tables 3.A.14 to 3.A.16 and Tables 3.A.20 to 3.A.28 include intra-
national trade as well as the dummy variable for international border crossings
of trade. Tables 3.A.11 to 3.A.16 show the complete results of the regressions
estimating cultural distance eﬀects on trade in levels, Tables 3.A.17 to 3.A.28 use
the proximity measure instead of distance.
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Chapter 4
The Eﬀects of Culture on Trade
over Time - New Evidence from the
GLOBE Data Set
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, cultural diﬀerences can have an impact on bi-
lateral trade ﬂows. The intuition is that people with the same cultural background
tend to trust each other more, speak a similar language, or simply have similar
institutions, which can facilitate trade. In the cross-sectional analysis presented
in the previous chapter, I show that diﬀerent cultural dimensions may have diﬀer-
ential eﬀects on bilateral trade values: similarity in some dimensions raise trade
ﬂows, while similarity in other dimensions reduces trade ﬂows. Moreover, there
are cultural dimensions which do not seem to have an impact on trade.
A major concern with the cross-sectional approach that could be raised is a po-
tential endogeneity problem. Especially trade policy variables are potentially not
exogeneous and may be correlated with unobservable cross-sectional trade costs.
To overcome this issue, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest to use panel data to-
gether with country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. In this chapter, I therefore turn to a panel
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data approach.1 Within this framework, I can ask how the importance of cultural
dimensions on trade ﬂows has changed over time. The value of world exports
has experienced a meteoric rise from an export value of 3,375 billion $ in 1990
to over 17,513 billion $ in 2017.2 Overall transportation costs have fallen, trade
agreements reach an all time high, and information can be sent without delay any-
where across the globe. What does this process mean for the inﬂuence of cultural
diﬀerences on trade? On the one hand it may be possible that due to increased
globalization the world has grown closer together and cultural diﬀerences have lost
their importance for international trade. On the other hand, it could be possible
that the fear of losing cultural identity has grown, leading to a stronger impact
because of the globalization process.
To answer this question, I estimate several speciﬁcations of the gravity equation by
means of a pseudo-poisson maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation which includes
zeros and intra-national trade ﬂows (Yotov, 2012) together with a comprehensive
set of ﬁxed eﬀects. I treat cultural distance similarly to geographical distance,
therefore the measure enters the trade costs function. As a proxy for cultural
distance I use the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavioral Eﬀectiveness
(GLOBE) research study of cross-cultural interactions (House et al., 2013), which
identiﬁes nine cultural dimensions. To analyze if these dimensions aﬀect certain
groups of industries diﬀerently, I make use of the product classiﬁcation by Rauch
(1999).
The results show that the eﬀect of cultural distance on trade is not persistent but
varies over time for many of the nine GLOBE dimensions. However, the eﬀects do
not follow a clear trend and depend on the cultural dimensions analyzed. Bilateral
trade ﬂows have become more responsive to some cultural dimensions and less
responsive to others, relative to the eﬀect in the base year. In addition, several
signiﬁcant eﬀects are only driven by trade with goods that are not traded on
organized exchanges, whereas the inﬂuence of other dimensions matters only for
goods that are classiﬁed to be homogeneous. To my knowledge, this ﬁnding has
not been widely discussed in the literature.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In the next section gives a
short overview of the related literature regarding the estimation of time-invariant
trade costs. Section 4.3 describes the GLOBE research study and its dimensions.
Then, I explain the indices for measuring cultural distance and proximity as well as
the composition of the data set. Section 4.5 provides an overview of the estimation
speciﬁcations. In section 4.6 I present my results and discuss them and oﬀer a short
1The methodology and data closely match the approach presented in Chapter 3.
2Source: IMF data on FOB Exports
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conclusion and an outlook in section 4.7.
4.2 Related literature
Substantial research has been done in the ﬁeld of cultural impacts on trade. An
overview of recent empirical studies which use proxies for cultural diﬀerences and
their impact on trade can be found in chapter 3 and is therefore not repeated here.
The most important insight from the previous review is that size and direction of
the impact vary across studies and depend on the choice of the proxies for culture.
With my proxy I assume that cultural diﬀerences are persistent or take a long time
to change. Therefore, I treat them as part of time-invariant trade costs. It is a
challenge to consistently estimate the eﬀect of such time-invariant trade costs on
trade values within a gravity framework. An example is the literature regarding
the so called "distance-elasticity puzzle". For many years, empirical ﬁndings did
not support the anecdotal evidence that distance eﬀects of bilateral trade ﬂows
have declined over time (Disdier & Head, 2008). Below I discuss some recent
examples of empirical work concerning this issue. The common feature is that
they all use yearly interactions with the distance measure in order to quantify the
change of the eﬀect and the estimation method PPML.
Yotov (2012) ﬁnds a solution to the distance puzzle in international goods trade.
He states that previous researchers using structural gravity only identiﬁed relative
international trade costs relative to other relative international trade costs. That
is the reason, why the negative eﬀect of distance remains roughly constant over
time. He stresses the importance to include intra-national trade ﬂows and intra-
national distances in order to identify the impact of international trade costs on
international trade relative to intra-national trade costs. Together with distance-
time interactions, he ﬁnds that the relative eﬀects of distance eﬀects on commodity
trade ﬂows have dropped signiﬁcantly between 1965 and 2005. A similar strategy
is applied by Anderson and Yotov (2017) with data from 1988 to 2006. In contrast
to Yotov (2012), they do not ﬁnd evidence for a declining but for a persistent eﬀect
of bilateral distance on the value of trade. By using data on global bank linkages
between countries instead of trade ﬂows, Brei and von Peter (2018) uncover that
the eﬀect of distance on assets and liabilities of banks from 1977 to 2012 is similar
to the distance eﬀect on trade, even though transport costs are immaterial. The
distance eﬀect is substantially negative but decreases over time. Instead of intra-
national trade they use domestic banking activity for their regression. However,
all three approaches potentially suﬀer from omitted variable bias, as they do not
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control for unobserved heterogeneity across country pairs by including pair ﬁxed
eﬀects (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). Bosquet and Boulhol (2015) include pair ﬁxed
eﬀects in their analysis but do not account for intra-national trade ﬂows and no
intra-national distances. By analyzing bilateral trade ﬂows between 1952 and
2006, they ﬁnd no evidence for a declining eﬀect of bilateral distance elasticities.
Following Yotov (2012) in his arguments, their interpretation of the results is
ﬂawed. Bergstrand et al. (2015) address these issues in their paper and make use
of intra-national distance, intra-national trade ﬂows, and include pair ﬁxed eﬀects
together with importer- and exporter-year ﬁxed eﬀects in order to consistently
estimate the eﬀects of distance on trade. They conclude that the negative eﬀect
of bilateral distance on international trade ﬂows has decreased by 1.2 percent per
year for the interval from 1990 to 2002.
Since I am interested in how the inﬂuence of cultural diﬀerences changes over time,
I follow the methodology of Bergstrand et al. (2015) in my analysis.
4.3 Cultural distance dimensions
The well-known WVS data set consists of interviews with 1,000 randomly chosen
people per country. In contrast, the GLOBE research program by House et al.
(2013) sent its questionnaires exclusively to middle managers from 951 organiza-
tions from the sectors ﬁnancial services, food processing, and telecommunications
across 60 diﬀerent cultures between the years 1994 and 1997. The same three sec-
tors are present in all countries across the survey and their setup is quite similar
across countries but each one is fundamentally diﬀerent compared to the other two.
This deliberate limitation explains, why the size of the GLOBE survey is smaller
than, e.g., the WVS. However, it may still be a relevant alternative to measure
cultural distance, as the cultural believes of business leaders are actually more
important for international trade than the believes of the remaining population.
This is due to the fact that these managers actually have the power to inﬂuence
the decision whether or not to trade with partners across borders. I add to the
literature as this group of people may share cultural views that fundamentally dif-
fer from the rest of the population. The GLOBE research program builds on the
cultural dimensions introduced by Hofstede (2001) and Hofstede et al. (2010)3 but
implements additional dimensions. The survey identiﬁes nine cultural dimensions
in total that are potentially important when analyzing an international business
3Their dimensions are called individualism versus collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power
distance, masculinity versus femininity, and long term orientation
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partner. In the following I brieﬂy introduce each of these dimensions.
Performance orientation reﬂects the amount to which a society encourages and
rewards innovation and improvement of its members. Assertiveness reﬂects the
degree to which members belonging to a society are ﬁrm, tough, dominant, and
aggressive in social relationships. Power distance reﬂects the degree to which
members of a society accept and approve that power should be shared unevenly. In-
group collectivism can be interpreted whether children take pride in the individual
accomplishments of their parents and vice versa, whether parents tend to live
at home with their children when they get older, and whether children live at
home with their parents until they get married. Institutional collectivism shows
the degree to which ﬁrms and societal institutional practices encourage and reward
collective action and collective distribution of resources. Future orientation mirrors
the extent to which members of a society believe that their current actions will
inﬂuence their future. Humane orientation reﬂects the degree to which a society
encourages and rewards its members for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous,
caring, and kind to others. Gender egalitarianism is a measure for the ways in
which societies divide roles between women and men.
I provide a detailed description of the nine cultural dimensions in the previous
chapter. Furthermore, I give information about the mean and the standard devi-
ation for each dimension and oﬀer a detailed list of all countries within the GLOBE
survey as well as their ranking.4
4.4 Data
The GLOBE indicators listed above stem from House et al. (2013). The methods
of generating the measures for cultural distance and proximity are identical to
the ones in the previous chapter. I compute the absolute value of the diﬀerence
between any two countries i and j for each of the nine culture dimensions and
divide it by 6:
cult_distij =
|(cult_dimensioni − cult_dimensionj)|
max(cult_dimension)−min(cult_dimension)
The drawback of this measure is once again that after taking logs of cultural dis-
4For a detailed illustration on how the survey is executed, see House et al. (2013), Part III
and IV.
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tances, country pairs with zero distance are omitted. Therefore, cultural proximity
is computed, where zero distance translates to a proximity value of unity.
cult_proxij = 1− |(cult_dimensioni − cult_dimensionj)|
max(cult_dimension)−min(cult_dimension)
Additionally, I generate measures for the average eﬀect of cultural distance and
proximity. The composition of the data set is similar to chapter 3. However, in-
stead of cross-sectional data I now extract panel data. The source of bilateral ex-
port data on the 6-digit industry level, which originally stems from COMTRADE,
is provided by CEPII's BACI for years after 1994 (Gaulier & Zignago, 2010). In-
formation about intra-national trade at the 3-digit level is taken from the Trade-
Prod data base by CEPII (de Sousa et al., 2012). This allows to consistently
estimate time invariant trade costs (Yotov, 2012) and to capture the eﬀects of
globalization on international trade (Bergstrand et al., 2015). Additional controls
like active RTAs, bilateral distance, contiguity, colonial background, and common
currency come from CEPII's Gravity (Head et al. (2010) and Head and Mayer
(2014)).
Like in chapter 3, I do not just use aggregate trade ﬂows but I allow for the
possibility that cultural distance potentially inﬂuences some industries diﬀerently
by using the product classiﬁcation by Rauch (1999). The product categories are
called homogeneous goods and diﬀerentiated goods.
Since trade ﬂows do not adjust on a yearly basis I restrict my sample to three-year
intervals as suggested by Olivero and Yotov (2012). The ﬁnal data set contains
about 12,000 country pair observations with four three-year intervals ranging from
1995 to 2004. Covered within the sample are seven African countries, 12 countries
from America, 15 from Asia, 18 from Europe, and four from the Middle East.
The minimum and maximum values, the mean, and the standard deviation of the
distance and proximity dimensions are identical to the ones in previous chapter
and can be found in the <Table 3.2, which yields the summary statistics for the
cross sectional data set. The same holds true regarding the number of country
pairs which share a colonial background and a common border. Diﬀerences arise
in the number of countries with a common currency. Their number has increased
from 96 to 1515 and the number of active RTAs has increased from 316 to 592.
5This increase is mainly due to the introduction of the Euro in the year 2002.
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4.5 Estimation strategy
The PPML approach proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) that I use in
this chapter has several advantages over the traditional OLS. First, PPML makes
use of the multiplicative instead of the logarithmic form of the gravity model.
Therefore, it is possible to include observations with zero trade ﬂows. Second, in
the presence of heteroscedasticity the estimation of the gravity equation in log-
linear form is potentially biased and inconsistent, the PPML performs well under
these circumstances.
Speciﬁcation (4.1) is designed to yield the average eﬀect of cultural distance on
trade:
Xij,t = exp
[
β1ln(cult_distij) +GRAV ITY
′
ij ∗ β
+
9∑
k=0
RTAij,t−k + λi,t + γj,t
]
∗ µij,t (4.1)
The left-hand side of this baseline regression denotes the value of exports from
country i to country j in period t. The variable of interest, ln(cult_distij), denotes
the log of bilateral cultural distance between exporter i and importer j based on
the nine GLOBE dimensions and their average eﬀect. The vector GRAV ITYij
includes the log of bilateral distance and the other time-invariant bilateral control
variables common border, common currency, and colonial background. RTAij,t
is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if an RTA is active between i
and j in period t together with 3-, 6-, and 9-year lags. This allows for phasing-in
eﬀects of RTAs. λi,t and γj,t capture exporter-time and importer-time ﬁxed eﬀects,
respectively. The error term is given by µij,t.
This approach most likely suﬀers from endogeneity because of omitted variable
bias. Therefore, pair ﬁxed eﬀects are included in speciﬁcation (4.2) to properly ac-
count for multilateral resistance between country pairs (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007).
Because of perfect collinearity with the ﬁxed eﬀects, the standard time-invariant
gravity controls can no longer be estimated. Furthermore, it is not possible to
estimate the eﬀects of cultural distance for all years in the sample. Therefore,
cult_dist_2004 is dropped from speciﬁcations (4.2) to (4.4). The remaining coef-
ﬁcients for distance and proximity are interpreted relative to the corresponding
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estimate for 2004.
Xij,t = exp
[
2001∑
T=1995
βT ln(cult_dist_Tij) +
9∑
k=0
RTAij,t−k + λi,t + γj,t + ij
]
∗ µij,t
(4.2)
In speciﬁcation (4.3), I estimate the eﬀect of the cultural dimensions on trade
values in levels instead of logs. This means it is possible to include country pairs
with identical cultural believes and it allows to include intra-national trade (Yotov,
2012). As suggested by Bergstrand et al. (2015) I include a measure for globaliza-
tion, INTL_BRDR. This dummy takes the value of unity if trade across borders
occurs and is zero otherwise. Due to perfect collinearity with the pair ﬁxed ef-
fects it is not possible to estimate the coeﬃcients for all years within the sample,
therefore the dummy for INTL_BRDR_2004 is dropped from the estimation:
Xij,t = exp
[ 2001∑
T=1995
βT (cult_dist_Tij) +
9∑
k=0
RTAij,t−k
+
2001∑
Y=1995
βY INTL_BRDR_(Y )ij + λi,t + γj,t + ij
]
∗ µij,t (4.3)
The ﬁnal speciﬁcation (4.4) makes use of the log of the proximity measure cult_proxij
instead of distance, since it is unclear from theory how cultural distance should
be estimated. Since there is no cultural proximity of zero, the sample size is the
same as in estimation approach (4.3), as are the controls and ﬁxed eﬀects. This is
the preferred speciﬁcation, as it uses all data available and properly accounts for
multilateral resistance:
Xij,t = exp
[ 2001∑
T=1995
βT ln(cult_prox_Tij) +
9∑
k=0
RTAij,t−k
+
2001∑
Y=1995
βY INTL_BRDR_(Y )ij + λi,t + γj,t + ij
]
∗ µij,t (4.4)
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4.6 Results
The following four tables present the results of the estimation speciﬁcations. Columns
(1) to (9) present each cultural dimension individually, column (10) provides the
eﬀect of the average of all nine dimensions. In Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.4, I use the
bilateral distance measure for the cultural dimensions. In Table 4.3 I make use of
the proximity measure.
In panel A of each table, I analyze the impact of culture on the overall export
value. In the next two panels, I apply the classiﬁcation by commodity groups
(Rauch, 1999): panel B reports the coeﬃcients for homogeneous goods and panel
C for diﬀerentiated goods. All speciﬁcations include importer-year and exporter-
year ﬁxed eﬀects. Reported standard errors are clustered at the country pair level
as it is common in the literature. However, in a panel gravity context, there are
several other dimensions in which the errors may be correlated: at the exporter,
importer, year, exporter-year, importer-year, and country pair level, respectively
(Cameron et al., 2011). Therefore, I report standard errors that are clustered at
these six dimensions (multi-way) for the variables of interest as well, following
Egger and Tarlea (2015). This clustering inﬂuences the size of the standard errors,
and therefore, the level of signiﬁcance of the reported coeﬃcients.6 The reported
R2 is calculated by computing the square of the correlation between trade and
ﬁtted values following the method described by Tenreyro.7 To ensure readability,
I display only the coeﬃcients for the variables of interest in this section and show
the complete regression outputs in Appendix 4.A.
Table 4.1 presents the results of the baseline regression, following speciﬁcation
(4.1). In panel A, the coeﬃcients of uncertainty avoidance, power distance, fu-
ture orientation, humane orientation, gender egalitarianism, and the measure for
average distance have the expected negative algebraic sign, the coeﬃcients of the
others are positive. However, just ﬁve out of nine (plus average) dimensions ap-
pear to aﬀect the value of aggregate exports statistically signiﬁcant. If bilateral
distance with respect to power distance increases by 1 percent, this corresponds to
an average decrease of -0.072 percent in the value of trade. Growing distance with
respect to in-group collectivism seems to boost trade by 0.075 percent. Both coef-
ﬁcients share a critical value of 0.1 percent when the standard errors are clustered
at country pair level and of 5 percent when they are clustered multi-way. The
coeﬃcients for future orientation, humane orientation, and gender egalitarianism
are given by -0.035, -0.038 and -0.045, respectively. All three are signiﬁcant at 5
percent when using country pair clustered errors and insigniﬁcant otherwise.
6If not speciﬁed otherwise, levels of signiﬁcance are based on multi-way clustered errors.
7See http://personal.lse.ac.uk/tenreyro/r2.do for details
77
4.6. RESULTS
T
ab
le
4.1:
A
verage
trad
e
eﬀ
ects
of
logged
cu
ltu
ral
d
istan
ce:
P
an
el
P
P
M
L
estim
ation
P
an
el
A
:
A
g
g
r
e
g
a
te
tr
a
d
e(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
D
istan
ce
variab
le
of
in
terest:
P
erf.
orien
t.
A
ssertiven
ess
U
n
cert.
avoid
an
ce
P
ow
er
d
ist.
In
-grou
p
coll.
In
stitu
tion
al
coll.
F
u
tu
re
orien
t.
H
u
m
an
e
orien
t.
G
en
d
er
egal.
A
verage
ln
(C
u
ltu
ral
d
istan
ce)
0.015
0.012
-0.029
-0.072
0.075
0.013
-0.035
-0.038
-0.045
-0.035
(0.016)
(0.023)
(0.015)
(0.019)***
(0.016)***
(0.025)
(0.018)*
(0.015)*
(0.018)*
(0.061)
[0.027]
[0.037]
[0.021]
[0.032]*
[0.029]*
[0.041]
[0.031]
[0.022]
[0.027]
[0.112]
N
11824
11824
11808
11808
11816
11808
11840
11816
11824
11880
R
2
0.0475
0.0482
0.0491
0.0499
0.0515
0.0477
0.0483
0.0486
0.0492
0.0486
P
an
el
B
:
H
o
m
o
g
e
n
e
o
u
s
g
o
o
d
s
ln
(C
u
ltu
ral
d
istan
ce)
0.004
-0.007
-0.055
-0.031
0.066
0.051
-0.036
-0.067
-0.066
-0.056
(0.019)
(0.030)
(0.019)**
(0.024)
(0.020)***
(0.032)
(0.023)
(0.020)***
(0.024)**
(0.078)
[0.029]
[0.043]
[0.027]*
[0.047]
[0.028]*
[0.053]
[0.029]
[0.034]*
[0.034]
[0.116]
N
11824
11824
11808
11808
11816
11808
11840
11816
11824
11880
R
2
0.0529
0.0533
0.0540
0.0539
0.0661
0.0523
0.0529
0.0535
0.0541
0.0543
P
an
el
C
:
D
iﬀ
e
r
e
n
tia
te
d
g
o
o
d
s
ln
(C
u
ltu
ral
d
istan
ce)
0.025
0.014
-0.008
-0.096
0.089
-0.017
-0.031
-0.022
-0.045
-0.030
(0.018)
(0.023)
(0.017)
(0.019)***
(0.018)***
(0.026)
(0.019)
(0.016)
(0.020)*
(0.062)
[0.033]
[0.039]
[0.025]
[0.028]***
[0.037]*
[0.038]
[0.038]
[0.021]
[0.027]
[0.127]
N
11824
11824
11808
11808
11816
11808
11840
11816
11824
11880
R
2
0.0397
0.0409
0.0415
0.0428
0.0396
0.0405
0.0410
0.0411
0.0419
0.0412
L
H
S
fo
r
estim
a
tio
n
m
eth
o
d
s:
ex
p
o
rt
va
lu
e.
D
ista
n
ce
d
eﬁ
n
itio
n
:
|(c
u
ltu
r
a
l_
d
im
e
n
s
io
n
i −
c
u
ltu
r
a
l_
d
im
e
n
s
io
n
j
)|
m
a
x
(c
u
lt_
d
im
e
n
s
io
n
)−
m
in
(c
u
lt_
d
im
e
n
s
io
n
)
.
C
o
lu
m
n
s
(1
)
to
(9
)
sh
ow
,
w
h
ich
o
f
th
e
n
in
e
d
iﬀ
eren
t
cu
ltu
ra
l
d
ista
n
ce
m
easu
res
is
u
sed
in
ea
ch
g
iven
sp
eciﬁ
ca
tio
n
,
see
ta
b
le
3.2
.
E
stim
a
tio
n
(1
0
)
u
ses
th
e
avera
g
e
o
f
a
ll
9
d
im
en
sio
n
s.
A
ll
estim
a
tio
n
s
in
clu
d
e
co
n
tro
ls
fo
r
d
ista
n
ce,
co
m
m
o
n
cu
rren
cy,
co
lo
n
ia
l
b
a
ck
g
ro
u
n
d
,
co
n
tig
u
ity,
R
T
A
s,
3
-,
6
-,
a
n
d
9
-y
ear
la
g
s
o
f
R
T
A
s
a
n
d
im
p
o
rter-yea
r
a
n
d
ex
p
o
rter-y
ea
r
ﬁ
x
ed
eﬀ
ects.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
erro
rs
in
p
a
ren
th
eses
a
re
clu
stered
a
t
co
u
n
try
p
a
ir
level
a
n
d
m
u
lti-w
ay
clu
stered
,
resp
ectiv
ely.
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
0
1
,*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
p
<
0
.0
5
78
Chapter 4
Panel B provides the eﬀects of cultural diﬀerences for exports of homogeneous
goods. A 1 percent increase in distance regarding uncertainty avoidance decreases
trade by -0.055 percent at 1 percent level of signiﬁcance. Contrarily, in-group col-
lectivism has a highly signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on trade with a coeﬃcient of 0.066.
The inﬂuence of humane orientation given by 0.067 is once again highly signiﬁc-
ant at the 0.1 percent level when clustering at the country pair level. All three
dimensions remain statistically signiﬁcant at critical values of 5 percent when clus-
tering multi-way. Bilateral diﬀerences in the perception of gender egalitarianism
decreases trade value by -0.066 percent at a critical value of 1 percent for country
pair clustered standard errors, the signiﬁcance is lost after clustering multi-way.
Three cultural distance measures return statistically signiﬁcant when focusing the
estimation on diﬀerentiated goods only. Power distance and in-group collectiv-
ism both inﬂuence trade at the 0.1 percent level of signiﬁcance using country
pair clustered errors, the former negatively with a coeﬃcient of -0.096, the latter
positively with a coeﬃcient of 0.089. The eﬀect remains highly signiﬁcant when
clustering multi-way for power distance and drops to a level of 5 percent for in-
group collectivism. The eﬀect of a 1 percent increase in bilateral distance regarding
gender egalitarianism decreases average trade by -0.045 percent and is signiﬁcant
for a critical value of 0.05 for country pair clustered errors and insigniﬁcant for
multi-way clustered errors. The other coeﬃcients regarding cultural distance are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and therefore do not have an eﬀect on the
value of exports across the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the dependent variable.
In order to put the cultural distance eﬀects into perspective, I oﬀer a back-of-the-
envelope calculation. Germany and Italy are closely related regarding their views
of power distance with a bilateral distance of 0.005. In 2016, Germany exported
commodities with a trade value of around 67 billion US$ to Italy. Following the
results from Table 4.1, if bilateral distance regarding this cultural dimension would
double, for example to the distance between Germany and Zimbabwe, export value
would decrease by -7.2 percent, or 4.8 billion US$. If the distance would be ten
times higher, like between Germany and the Philippines, the negative eﬀect would
lead to a decrease of trade value by -72 percent or by 48.24 billion US$.8
However, the size of the point estimators should be treated with caution. Because
pair-ﬁxed eﬀects are not included, the regressions most likely suﬀer from omitted
variable bias. Table 4.1 should give an idea in which direction the dimensions
inﬂuence trade. Since only in-group collectivism end gender egalitarianism inﬂu-
ence trade positively and persistently across the three speciﬁcations, the results of
this table additionally show that the distinction between diﬀerent goods categories
8Own calculations based on COMTRADE data from 2016.
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oﬀers additional insights that is otherwise lost through aggregation.
In Table 4.2, I estimate the eﬀect of cultural distance on trade over time using
speciﬁcation (4.2) with pair ﬁxed eﬀects together with the country-year ﬁxed ef-
fects to properly account for multilateral resistance (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007).
The coeﬃcients are interpreted as deviations from the cultural distance eﬀect in
the base year 2004 and compared with the ﬁndings in Table 4.1. If the estimated
coeﬃcients in Table 4.1 are insigniﬁcant, the average eﬀect of these distance meas-
ures on trade is assumed to be zero. For the aggregate goods case in panel A, ﬁve
distance dimensions inﬂuence trade diﬀerently over time. An increase in bilateral
distance by 1 percent regarding performance orientation is not signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ent in the year 1995 compared to 2004 but its inﬂuence is larger by 0.022 percent
in 1998 and by 0.008 percent in 2001 relative to 2004. Assertiveness has a greater
impact on the value of trade in 1995 and 1998 in comparison to 2004 by 0.021
percent and 0.01 percent, respectively. Both are signiﬁcant at 5 percent. The
eﬀect remains constant for 2001. With respect to the dimension of institutional
collectivism, bilateral distance has a greater eﬀect of 0.022 percent in 1995 than
in 2004 with a critical value of 0.05 and remains constant for the other periods.
The eﬀect of growing distance in humane orientation on trade exports varies over
time as well. For the year 1995 it is 0.02 percent larger relative to 2004 and 0.018
percent larger for 2001, the former being signiﬁcant at 5 percent, the latter at 1
percent. In 1998, there is no signiﬁcant change. This means that the signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect of this dimension from the baseline regression used to be smaller in
1995 and in 2001 compared to 2004. The inﬂuence of the average distance measure
changes signiﬁcantly over time. At the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance, the eﬀect is
larger by 0.068 percent in contrast to 2004, while it increases by 0.086 percent for
1998 and by 0.029 percent for 2001. Both share critical values of 0.01. The eﬀect
of the other ﬁve dimensions seems to remain persistent relative to 2004.
The analysis in panel B once again focuses on exports of homogeneous goods only.
Diﬀerences in assertiveness inﬂuence trade more in 2001 than in 2004 by 0.018
percent at a critical value of 0.05. The eﬀect of institutional collectivism is larger
by 0.049 percent in 1995 and by 0.047 percent in 1998 when compared to 2004. The
former coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 1 percent, the latter at 5 percent. The estimated
coeﬃcients for humane orientation suggest that the eﬀect of this dimension on
trade is 0.035 percent larger in 1995 and 0.04 percent larger in 2001 than the
corresponding eﬀect in 2004. These eﬀects are signiﬁcant at 5 percent and 0.1
percent, respectively. Similarly to panel A this points towards the fact that the
overall negative eﬀect of humane orientation used to be smaller in 1995 and 2001.
Average distance had a higher magnitude of 0.109 percent in 1998 relative to 2004.
The inﬂuence of the remaining distance dimensions did not change over time.
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4.6. RESULTS
In panel C, the sample exclusively covers exports of diﬀerentiated goods. The
impact of six cultural dimensions varies signiﬁcantly over time. The greater in-
ﬂuence of assertiveness on trade in 1995 relative to 2004 is 0.035 percent. The
coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant, too. When comparing 1998 to 2004, this cultural
distance dimension aﬀects trade by 0.02 percent more in 1998 compared to 2004
and is statistically signiﬁcant at 5 percent. The distance measure of performance
orientation has a greater inﬂuence on trade of 0.029 percent in 1995, of 0.031
percent in 1998, and of 0.017 percent in 2001 when compared to 2004. The ﬁrst
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 5 percent, while the other two are highly signiﬁcant at
0.1 percent. Relative to 2004, the eﬀect of in-group collectivism on trade is 0.041
percent larger in 1995, 0.027 percent larger in 1998, and 0.01 percent larger 2001
with critical values of 0.01 for the ﬁrst two, and 0.001 for the last coeﬃcient. This
means that the positive inﬂuence of in-group collectivism from the baseline regres-
sion has decreased over time. The inﬂuence of future orientation has increased by
0.025 percent for 2004 relative to 1995 at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance. The
eﬀect of cultural distance on exports regarding gender egalitarianism decreases the
negative impact on trade by 0.014 percent in 2001 compared to 2004. This eﬀect
is signiﬁcant at a critical value of 0.05. The inﬂuence of the measure for average
distance varies over time as well. It is larger by 0.089 percent in 1998 and by
0.042 percent in 2001 relative to 2004. The coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at levels of
5 percent and 1 percent, respectively.
The eﬀect of cultural distance on trade varies over time but greatly depends on
the dimension and goods speciﬁcation. The eﬀects of performance orientation,
institutional collectivism, and humane orientation on the aggregate are driven by
either homogeneous goods or diﬀerentiated goods. Eﬀects of in-group collectivism,
future orientation, and gender egalitarianism are only signiﬁcant for diﬀerentiated
goods and are masked in the aggregate. Except for one dimension, the signiﬁcant
eﬀects relative to the base year are larger in previous years and become smaller
over time. It is interesting to note that most of the coeﬃcients that inﬂuenced
trade signiﬁcantly and negatively in the case of uncertainty avoidance, power dis-
tance, future orientation, and gender egalitarianism and positively in the case of
in-group collectivism in the baseline regression return insigniﬁcant in Table 4.2.
This means that their eﬀect has remained persistent over time. It is unexpected
that all signiﬁcant coeﬃcients have a positive algebraic sign. This would lead to
the interpretation that cultural distance used to have a more positive impact on
the value of trade in the years 1995, 1998, and 2001 relative to the base year
2004. However, this speciﬁcation may be ﬂawed as it omits country pairs with the
smallest cultural distance by deﬁnition.9
9When clustering at the country pair level, the number of signiﬁcant estimators changes
somewhat but the overall interpretation remains the same.
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In order to allow for country pairs to share identical cultural believes, I include
the bilateral distance measures into the regression in levels instead of logs, follow-
ing speciﬁcation (4.3). Moreover, this means that country pairs with the same
importer and exporter are now part of the sample, allowing to include and control
for intra-national trade. The sample size increases by around 200 observations and
Table 4.3 provides the results.
For nine out of the ten cultural distance dimensions including the average eﬀect,
there is a signiﬁcant change regarding their impact on export value over time with
respect to the base year 2004 for the aggregate goods speciﬁcation in panel A.
The impact of a 1 percent increase in distance on trade regarding the measure for
performance orientation is 232 percent (= 100 ∗ [e1.2 − 1]) larger and positive in
2001 than in 2004 at a critical value of 0.001. If diﬀerences regarding assertiveness
increase by 1 percent, the eﬀect on trade is positive and larger by 93 percent
in 1995 and increases to 123 percent in 1998 in comparison to 2004 with a 1
percent level of signiﬁcance. For 2001, the eﬀect remains constant. Relative to
2004, the eﬀect of cultural distance measured by uncertainty avoidance inﬂuences
trade negatively and stronger in the years 1995 and 2001 by -71 percent and by
-32 percent, respectively. The ﬁrst coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level, the latter at the 0.1 percent level, while there is no signiﬁcant change
in 1998 compared to 2004. The baseline regression suggests that on average an
increase of bilateral distance regarding power distance has a negative eﬀect on
trade. However, in 1998 this negative eﬀect is smaller by 210 percent relative to
the corresponding eﬀect in 2004 and is signiﬁcant at a critical value of 5 percent.
The positive impact of cultural distance regarding in-group collectivism on trade
is constant for 1995 and 1998 and signiﬁcantly stronger at the 5 percent threshold
by 47 percent in 2001 relative to 2004. In comparison to 2004, distance regarding
institutional collectivism used to have a positive and stronger impact on trade of
138 percent in 1995 and of 139 percent in 1998. The ﬁrst coeﬃcient is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, the second at the 5 percent level. The negative
eﬀect of future orientation on trade is highly signiﬁcant for 2001 and used to be
stronger by -42 percent with respect to 2004. Compared to 2004, the negative eﬀect
from the baseline regression of humane orientation on trade is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent in 1995 but it decreases in 1998 by a positive impact that is 80 percent
stronger. In 2001, the negative impact is then again ampliﬁed by -73 percent in
2001. Both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at critical values of 0.05. The measure of
average distance shares the same level of signiﬁcance with the previous dimension
and used to decrease trade by -82 percent more in 2001 than in 2004. The negative
eﬀect of gender egalitarianism from the baseline regression seems to be persistent
over time.
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Chapter 4
Panel B yields the estimation results focusing on homogeneous goods only. The
eﬀect of performance orientation across time is comparable to the aggregate goods
case and implies no signiﬁcant changes for 1995 and 1998 but a positive impact
on trade that is 208 percent larger in 2001 compared to 2004 at a critical value of
0.001. Bilateral diﬀerences regarding assertiveness inﬂuence trade for homogen-
eous diﬀerently compared to the aggregate goods case. Here, the positive eﬀect
is still highly signiﬁcant and stronger by 59 percent compared to 2004. The the
driver for this relative increase is the year 2001, while the impact remains constant
for the other years. The negative average inﬂuence on trade from the baseline
regression of a 1 percent increase of bilateral distance regarding uncertainty avoid-
ance is made stronger by -80 percent in 1995 and by -48 percent in 2001. The
coeﬃcient for 1995 is statistically signiﬁcant at 1 percent, the one for 2001 at 5
percent. It remains unchanged for 1998. The distance measure seems to lose its
strength over time. The eﬀect of a 1 percent increase regarding diﬀerent perception
of power distance is negative and dramatically larger by -93 percent in 2001 than
in to 2004 at a critical value of 0.05. The impact of bilateral distance regarding in-
stitutional collectivism on the other hand highly signiﬁcantly boosts trade in 1995
and is 234 percent larger than in 2004. The eﬀect remains constant in the other
years. The coeﬃcient of future orientation is negative and signiﬁcant at 5 percent
for the year 1995, and imply an increase of the potential negative impact of this
dimension on trade by -84 percent relative to 2004. Diﬀerences regarding gender
egalitarianism positively inﬂuence trade by 833 percent for 1998 relative to 2004
and the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the critical value of 0.001. The negative eﬀects
of bilateral cultural distance on the export value of homogeneous goods from the
baseline regression for in-group collectivism and humane orientation are constant
over time.
Seven distance measures signiﬁcantly change their inﬂuence on trade with diﬀer-
entiated goods in panel C over time with respect to the base year. The eﬀect of
performance orientation is persistent and highly signiﬁcant across good speciﬁc-
ations. Similar to panels A and B, the eﬀect of an increase in bilateral distance
on trade is positive and used to be stronger for 2001 in contrast to 2004, in this
speciﬁcation by 256 percent. Assertiveness aﬀects trade diﬀerently over time. For
1995 and 1998 the eﬀect on trade is positive and grows in strength in comparison
to 2004 by 144 percent and by 183 percent, respectively. In 2001, the trade im-
pact is negative and decreases by 67 percent relative to 2004. The coeﬃcients for
1995 and 1998 are signiﬁcant at critical values of 0.001, the one for 2001 at 1 per-
cent. An increase of bilateral distance regarding uncertainty avoidance increases
its negative eﬀect on trade by 49 percent for 1995 and by 73 percent for 2001. The
ﬁrst coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 5 percent, the other at 0.1 percent. In contrast to
the other speciﬁcations, the negative impact of this distance measure grows over
85
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time for diﬀerentiated goods. The signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on the otherwise
negative average eﬀect of power distance on trade for 1995 in the aggregate case is
driven by exports of diﬀerentiated goods. The coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 5 percent
and shows that the positive impact in this year is larger by 194 percent than in
2004. The same holds true for in-group collectivism. The average eﬀect is negative
as suggested by the baseline regression but in 2001 this negative inﬂuence was
smaller by 78 percent relative to 2004. The level of signiﬁcance is 1 percent. Dif-
ferences with respect to the dimension institutional collectivism increased trade by
106 percent more in 1995 than in the following years, where there is no deviation
from the eﬀect in 2004. The coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at a critical value of 5 percent.
The eﬀect of future orientation is persistent for 1995 and 1998 but highly signiﬁc-
antly decreased by -46 percent in contrast to the base year. Diﬀerences in humane
orientation are statistically signiﬁcant at 1 percent and show a decrease on the
trade value of exports for 2001 that is stronger by -73 percent when compared to
2004 and unchanged otherwise. The negative trade eﬀects of gender egalitarianism
remain unchanged over time.
Overall, the inclusion of countries with the same cultural values and intra-national
trade changes the results in Table 4.3 signiﬁcantly in contrast to Table 4.2. The
trade eﬀects of bilateral cultural distance on trade are no longer consistently pos-
itive and larger relative to 2004 but several eﬀects used to be more negative. This
is a more plausible result but still somewhat surprising when compared to the per-
ceived general trend of bilateral distance, in which distance persistently decreases
over time. The eﬀect of the cultural distance dimensions on trade seems to signi-
ﬁcantly change over the observed time span but it does not seem to follow a clear
trend. Some eﬀects grow in size, while others decrease over time. Some show a
positive and some show a negative impact on trade. Furthermore, the choice of
goods speciﬁcation matters for signiﬁcance and magnitude. These results show
that the impact on cultural distance on trade is not as clear as it may appear and
needs to be approached with caution. As a robustness check, the eﬀect of cultural
distance on the value of trade is re-estimated without the scaling process. Two
coeﬃcients which were barely signiﬁcant in Table 4.3 lose their signiﬁcance, the
results of the other 58 regressions are identical to Table 4.3 if the coeﬃcients are
multiplied by the scaling-factor 6. Tables 4.A.10 to 4.A.12 provide the results in
the appendix.
Finally, Table 4.4 presents the eﬀects of the measures of cultural proximity on
trade instead of cultural distance and follows speciﬁcation (4.4). As distance is
commonly estimated in elasticities, the nine proximity dimensions and the av-
erage proximity measure are log-linearized. Due to the design of the measure,
it still allows to include countries with the same cultural background as well as
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intra-national trade. With the exception of two coeﬃcients, which appear signi-
ﬁcant only in the proximity speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcients' level of signiﬁcance is
identical to Table 4.3. By deﬁnition, the eﬀect of cultural proximity on trade works
in the opposite direction as distance, therefore, the algebraic signs are reversed.
Moreover, the size of the coeﬃcients is similar as well. However, as the proximity
dimensions are interpreted as elasticities, the size of the coeﬃcients translates dir-
ectly to a percentage change on trade values if proximity increases by 1 percent.
Thus, the eﬀects provided in Table 4.4 are much smaller compared to Table 4.3.
For example, the eﬀect of a 1 percent increase of proximity regarding performance
orientation in 1998 in panel A leads to less trade compared to 2004 by -1.049 per-
cent. When the eﬀect is estimated in levels, the corresponding eﬀect is a decrease
of -232 percent. Since there is no theory foundation (yet) on how cultural distance
should be measured, both measures are potentially correct. Nonetheless, I argue
that the results provided in Table 4.4 are more plausible compared to Table 4.3 as
they indicate that the eﬀect of cultural proximity on trade does not change much
across the observed time span or remains persistent.
4.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, the changing eﬀect of bilateral cultural diﬀerences on the value of
exports was analyzed over time using the nine cultural dimensions introduced by
GLOBE (House et al., 2013) together with state-of-the-art empirical methods. The
answer is not as clear as it might be on ﬁrst sight: Neither diminishes the impact of
cultural distance on trade values persistently in the face of increased globalization,
nor has it consistently been strengthened. From the results above, there is no clear
trend apparent for the importance of cultural distance for bilateral trade in the face
of globalization. Depending on the cultural dimensions, the eﬀects diﬀer over the
observed time span. Its eﬀect has remained persistent for some dimensions, while
it has increased or decreased for others over time. This shows that the choice
of deﬁnition for the term culture is very important. Moreover, the aggregation
of commodity groups introduced by Rauch (1999) aﬀects the results and oﬀers
new insights. Several signiﬁcant eﬀects on the aggregate goods case are either
driven by diﬀerentiated or homogeneous goods. This information would otherwise
have been lost. It has been shown that it makes a big diﬀerence, whether or not
intra-national trade is included into the regression, highlighting the importance
to do so (Yotov (2012), Bergstrand et al. (2015)). Finally, it does not change
the level of signiﬁcance of the estimation results, whether culture is measured by
bilateral distance in levels or proximity in logs. However, the interpretation of the
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coeﬃcients depends on the speciﬁcation and leads to diﬀerent inferences.
For further research the scope of the analysis should be increased to capture the
steady increase of the globalization process in the 2000s. So far, this can be done
on the aggregate level but not on the product level for all countries within the
sample. The previous analysis showed how important it is to make use of a data
set like TradeProd that allows to distinguish diﬀerent commodity groups and that
includes intra-national trade as well.
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4.A Additional tables
The following appendix shows the complete estimation tables, except for the
ﬁxed eﬀects dummies. All speciﬁcations include importer-year and exporter-year
ﬁxed eﬀects. Tables 4.A.1 to 4.A.3 show the results for the baseline regression
without pair ﬁxed eﬀects but with additional time-invariant control variables for
geographical bilateral distance, common currency, common border, and colonial
background. In all the following regressions, country pair ﬁxed eﬀects are included.
Tables 4.A.4 and 4.A.5 show results for the PPML approach without intra-national
trade. Tables 4.A.7 to 4.A.15 include intra-national trade as well as the dummy
variable for international border crossings of trade. Tables 4.A.7 to 4.A.9 show
the complete results of the regressions estimating cultural distance eﬀects on trade
in levels, Tables 4.A.13 to 4.A.15 use the proximity measure instead of distance.
Tables 4.A.10 to 4.A.12 yield the results for the robustness regressions without the
scaling process of cultural distance.
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Chapter 5
The Eﬀects of Economic Sanctions
on Trade: New Evidence from a
Panel PPML Gravity Approach
5.1 Introduction
Economic sanctions and embargoes as an alternative to brute force are popular
instruments of diplomatic behavior against ill-behaving states since the beginning
of the 20th century, and they continue to be popular today. After the annexation
of the Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014, the European Union
(EU), the United States of America (USA), and several other states were quick
to implement sanctions against Russia. Russia, in turn, reacted by implementing
multilateral trade sanctions on its own, speciﬁcally, a total ban on food imports
from the EU, North America, Norway and Australia. These sanctions have been
renewed and are still active today. Another prominent example is the case of
economic sanctions of the UN against North Korea, which have been increased in
number and severity numerous times as a reaction to North Korea's continuous
tests of nuclear missiles. Most recently, the USA plan to reinstate their sanctions
against Iran in August 2018.
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Figure 5.1 illustrates the number of sanctions active in a given year over the period
from 1984 until 2005. It shows that the number of active economic sanctions has
remained rather steady until 1990. After 1990, their usage has grown drastically,
from under 100 to over 600 in just 15 years.1
Figure 5.1: Number of sanctions per year
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Source: Own calculation based on data provided by Hufbauer et al. (2009)
The basic idea behind sanctions as a political instrument can be summarized by
a quote of US-President Wilson from 1919: `A nation that is boycotted is a nation
that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy
and there will be no need for force. It does not cost a life outside the nation
boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no
modern nation could resist '.
Given the prevalence of sanctions, it is a straightforward question to ask whether
they are an eﬀective tool to enforce the goal(s) of sender countries. From an
anecdotal perspective, the success rate does not seem to be overwhelming. Cuba
has not abandoned its socialist regime due to pressure from the USA, Russia has
not taken any steps to undo the annexation of the Crimea, and North Korea keeps
testing missiles, to name just some examples. Especially North Korea has been
subjected to drastic sanctions from many countries across the globe for numerous
years. Hufbauer et al. (2009) show that only about one in three sanctions yields
the desired political outcome.
1If unions like the EU or the Arab League are part of a sanction, the sanction is attributed
to each member country individually.
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With President Wilson's quote in mind, how is it possible for a country to resist
these sanctions? Two explanations come to mind. First, it is possible that eco-
nomic sanctions simply do not yield the desired punishing eﬀect by not reducing
existing trade between the sender and the targeted country. Secondly, countries
that are aﬀected by sanctions, either as a sender or a target, might switch their
trade partners with little costs and therefore circumvent the expected trade reduc-
tion, which potentially oﬀsets the negative eﬀects of the sanctions mechanism.
In this chapter I add to the sanctions literature by empirically evaluating these
potential explanations. In a ﬁrst step, I quantify the partial trade eﬀect of sanctions
and potential counter-sanctions on international trade by estimating a gravity
equation. My preferred speciﬁcation is a pseudo poisson maximum likelihood
(PPML) panel estimation which includes zeros and intra-national trade ﬂows and
a comprehensive set of ﬁxed eﬀects. Furthermore, I use standard OLS and ﬁrst
diﬀerence (FD) regressions. I argue that the implementation of sanctions can
be treated similarly to the formation of a regional trade agreement between two
countries, but with the opposite intention, of course. Instead of abolishing tariﬀs
and streamlining standards to facilitate trade, it is possible to interpret a sanction
like the introduction of an inﬁnitely high tariﬀ that prevents countries from trading
speciﬁc goods or from trading all together. Therefore, sanctions enter the trade
costs function. Moreover, I test the policy variables for endogeneity. The results
show that the implementation of sanctions has a robust signiﬁcant negative impact
on bilateral trade between countries within the sample of around 9 percent when
using OLS and PPML but no signiﬁcant eﬀect when using FD.
Next, I diﬀerentiate sanctions by severity types. I ﬁnd that moderate sanctions
are the drivers of the negative overall impact, not extensive sanctions. Limited
sanctions and extensive sanctions do not inﬂuence trade signiﬁcantly. I repeat this
analysis for yearly data instead of using three-year intervals. The results show that
the eﬀects of sanctions become a lot more volatile and their signiﬁcance depends on
the choice of standard errors. To shed some light on the eﬀectiveness of sanctions,
I check for trade diversion. The results vary with the estimation method. Using
OLS I ﬁnd evidence for trade diversion but the result is not robust to the ﬁrst
diﬀerencing approach.
My data set covers the years from 1987 to 2005, making use of the Threat and Im-
position of Economic Sanctions data base (TIES), the Direction of Trade Statistics
data base (DOTS) and CEPII. To the best of my knowledge, nobody so far has
used a data set of this magnitude to answer the questions above and has properly
accounted for endogeneity, multilateral resistance, and theory consistency at the
same time.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews
the literature related to economic sanctions and trade. Section 5.3 introduces the
sources and explains the composition of the data set. Section 5.4 provides an
overview regarding the empirical speciﬁcations. Then, I present empirical results
and discussions in section 5.4 and section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Literature review
Several researchers have tried their hands at explaining the consequences of eco-
nomic sanctions on trade from various angles, both theoretically and empirically. I
here review some of the recent empirical results based on the gravity framework.2
Many researchers focus on empirical eﬀects of sanctions imposed by a single coun-
try, hereafter called "sender". Most chose the USA, since they are the most prom-
inent user of economic sanctions as means of foreign policy. Hufbauer and Oegg
(2003) quantify the damage of US sanctions on US trade and diﬀerentiate by
severity of sanction types. The estimated negative eﬀect of implementing an ex-
tensive sanctions in 1995 is a decrease of US exports to a sanctioned country by
99 percent and by 95 percent for 1999, while the eﬀect of moderate and limited
sanctions for the same periods is insigniﬁcant or even slightly positive. In addition,
Caruso (2003) ﬁnds a large negative impact of extensive unilateral US sanctions
against 49 target countries: on average, sanctions lead to a drop in US exports
of 87 percent over the period from 1960 until 2000. Additionally, he oﬀers some
evidence for positive eﬀects of trade diversion for limited and moderate sanctions
by comparing US trade with countries targeted unilaterally by US sanctions to
G-7 countries' trade with the same countries. Yang et al. (2004) group countries
together by certain characteristics, e.g., being a former part of the Soviet Union.
They cover the period from 1980 to 1998, taking 5-year intervals, and estimat-
ing each interval separately. Their results are mixed for the eﬀects of unilateral
2There are several authors who focus on eﬀects of economic sanctions as well, but use diﬀerent
frameworks for their analysis: Dreger et al. (2015) focus on the depreciation of the Ruble after
the Western sanctions took aﬀect after the annexation of the Crimea and the Russian counter-
sanctions that followed after 2014. Using daily exchange rate data from January 2014 to March
2015, they ﬁnd that the depreciation was mainly caused by the decrease of oil prices and not
so much due to economic sanctions of the West. Crozet and Hinz (2016) concentrate on the
costs of imposing and maintaining sanctions on Russia for the sender countries utilizing monthly
country-level trade data, from December 2013 to June 2015. Using French ﬁrm-level export data,
they show that after the implementation of sanctions both, the extensive and intensive margin
of exports have been strongly reduced.
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US sanctions and their ﬁndings greatly vary with the deﬁnition of their country
samples. The authors use the EU and Japan to quantify a trade diversion eﬀect
due to US sanctions but do not ﬁnd evidence to support this claim.
Other authors, like Haidar (2017), explore the eﬀects of sanctions on a single target.
He focuses on sanctions targeting Iranian exporters between 2006 and 2011 and
ﬁnds ﬁrm level evidence for trade diversion. According to his results, two-thirds
of Iranian export value has been diverted from sanctioning to non-sanctioning
countries.
The empirical results of the research mentioned above are likely to suﬀer from
severe endogeneity bias. This is mainly due because the authors did not properly
control for the multilateral resistance terms using ﬁxed eﬀects (see Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2003)).
To shed more light on reasons for potential success or failure of economic sanctions,
Early (2009) runs a probit estimation covering the years from 1950 to 1990. He
ﬁnds that close allies of a sanctioning country are most likely to increase trade
with the target country, therefore helping to reduce the impact of the sanction.
Using multinomial logit and data on US sanctions, Early (2011) concludes that the
decision of third countries to help sanctioned countries is not driven by political
but by commercial interests.
Yang et al. (2009) compare the eﬀects of imposing sanctions on trade between the
US and countries that are targeted by US sanctions with trade between the EU
and those target countries between 1980 to 2003. They report that unilateral US
sanctions have a negative eﬀect on the trade value of the EU with those target
countries as well. As a potential reason, the authors suggest that extensive sanc-
tions imposed by the US may have a negative impact on a target country's total
economic activity and trade.
Other authors have looked at the threat of sanctions and the optimal duration
of sanctions. Afesorgbor (2018) provide some evidence that the mere threat of
sanctions actually boosts trade between target and sender, while imposed sanctions
decrease trade. In contrast to this, Kohl and Reesink (2016) ﬁnd no evidence that
the threat of sanctions has any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the value of trade. Dizaji and
van Bergeijk (2013) focus on the optimal duration of economic sanctions. For this,
they develop a theoretical model and test it empirically via vector autoregression
models by using the boycott of Iranian oil as a case study. Their key ﬁnding is
that the success probability of sanctions is higher in the short run and decreases
in the long run, as the economic costs reach their peak after the ﬁrst two years
and decrease afterwards due to economic adjustment.
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Hufbauer et al. (2009) give detailed information of the goals and the success or
failure of economic sanctions for the 20th century. The authors ﬁnd that only every
third sanction is a success. Furthermore, they suggest that policy makers should
use so called "smart sanctions", which target only speciﬁc sectors, instead of total
embargoes because the success rate is higher.
5.3 Data
The information of the duration of sanctions and which countries are involved
as senders and targets stems from the TIES data base by Morgan et al. (2014).
It contains speciﬁc records of cases of economic sanctions, including both, their
threats and impositions from 1945 until 2005. The authors diﬀerentiate between 10
types of sanctions by severity. I group these sanction types into three categories,
following Hufbauer and Oegg (2003), namely extensive, moderate, and limited
sanctions. Extensive sanctions contain total economic embargoes and blockades,
e.g., those against Cuba. Partial economic embargoes, speciﬁc import and export
restrictions, and suspension of trade agreements are combined within moderate
sanctions. Finally, limited sanctions refer to travel bans, termination of foreign
aid, and asset freezes.
If a country has multiple sanction types in place, I only count the most severe.
Sanctions that were merely threatened but never actually imposed are not included
within my sample; neither is information whether sanctions ended because the goal
of the sending countries was reached, or whether they were abolished because of
other political reasons. Most prior empirical research of economic sanctions make
use of the data set by Hufbauer et al. (2009). However, TIES oﬀers a signiﬁcant
increase in the number of sanction cases.
Information of free-on-board (fob) export value on the country level is provided by
the direction of trade statistics data base (DOTS) from the International Monetary
Fund. To ensure theory consistent estimators of bilateral trade policy (Dai et al.,
2014) and to capture the eﬀects of globalization on international trade (Bergstrand
et al., 2015), not only international but intra-national trade is included as well.
Moreover, this allows to identify and estimate the eﬀects of non-discriminatory
trade policy (Heid et al., 2015). I compute intra-national trade values by taking
the diﬀerence of each country's gross domestic product provided by CEPII (Head
et al. (2010), Head and Mayer (2014)) and the sum of its total fob exports per
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year using the DOTS data.3
Gravity controls for distance, common language, colonial ties, contiguity, and trade
agreements come from CEPII (Head et al. (2010), Head and Mayer (2014)).
Following Olivero and Yotov (2012), I use three year intervals to allow trade ﬂows
to adjust to changes in trade costs. Furthermore, I want to reduce anticipation
eﬀects of potential sanctions in the future. In conclusion, the data set covers the
years 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2005 and the sample size consists of
around 132,497 observations of (non-singleton) country pairs. This bilateral panel
data set exceeds the data sets that have been used in the literature in time and
country coverage.
Table 5.1 provides summary statistics for the sanctions data set. Within the sample
there is a total of 2,355 active trade agreements. 362 country pairs have a common
colonial background, 4,096 share their primary language, and 492 countries are
neighbors. Aggregate trade value varies from zero to over 300 billion USD. The
closest country pair in the sample is Hongkong and Macau with a geographical
distance of 60 kilometers, while the largest distance covered is from Taiwan to
Paraguay.
The average time span of a sanction is around 8 years, but the duration var-
ies greatly. Some only last several months, while others last up to 47 years.
An example for the latter are India's sanctions against South Africa during the
Apartheid.
More than 780 country pairs are aﬀected by sanctions at least in one year over the
observed period from 1987 to 2005. If sanctions are grouped due to their severity,
there is a total of 24 severe, 683 moderate, and 79 limited sanctions.
3This shirt-sleeved approach is necessary because, so far, there is no information on aggregate
intra-national trade available that covers all countries within the sample. Bergstrand et al. (2015)
and Yotov (2012) use this method as well.
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of sanctions data set
Total number of RTAs 2,355
Total number of pairs with colonial background 362
Total number of pairs with common border 492
Total number of pairs with common language 4,096
Total number of sanctions 786
Total number of limited sanctions 79
Total number of moderate sanctions 683
Total number of extensive sanctions 24
Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Total trade (in mln USD) 0.00 302,195.4 256.16 2806.27
Distance (in km) 60.77 19,781.39 7,515.55 4,520.1
Duration of a sanction (in years) < 1 47 8.25 9.42
5.4 Estimation strategy
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation of the gravity equation which is estimated using ﬁxed eﬀects
OLS (FE) is given below:
ln(Xij,t) = β1SANCij,t +
3∑
k=0
βt−kRTAij,t−k + ρINTL_BRDRij,t
+ µi,t + λj,t + ϑij + ij,t. (5.1)
Here, Xij,t denotes the value of exports of sender i to target j in year t. The
sanction-dummy SANCij,t takes the value of 1 if country j is the target of an
active sanction by country i in year t, and zero otherwise.
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In order to diﬀerentiate the eﬀects of diﬀerent severity types of sanctions I classify
them by groups (Hufbauer & Oegg, 2003). Furthermore, I include a dummy that
captures active RTAs, RTAij,t, together with 3-, 6- and 9-year lags. This is done to
allow for time-varying or non-linear eﬀects of RTAs. INTL_BRDRij,t is a dummy
that captures globalization eﬀects such as technology and innovation (Bergstrand
et al., 2015). It takes the value of 1 if international trade occurs, and zero otherwise.
Because of perfect collinearity with the other ﬁxed eﬀects, the border dummy for
the most recent year in the sample is dropped from the estimation.
It is possible, that shocks hit only the importer or the exporter in a given year,
such as potential changes in legislature after an election within a country that
could either be a boost or a hindrance to trade. To account for these multilateral
resistance terms, speciﬁcation (5.1) includes exporter-year and importer-year ﬁxed
eﬀects denoted by µi,t and λj,t, respectively. Unobserved pair-speciﬁc character-
istics aﬀect trade ﬂows, too (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). To account for this, the
pair ﬁxed eﬀect ϑij is included.
Because of perfect collinearity, ϑij captures all time-invariant country pair speciﬁc
inﬂuences on trade, both, observable and unobservable. The drawback is that it is
not possible to quantify, e.g., the eﬀect of common language on the value of trade.
The trade eﬀects of time-varying variables, like sanctions, can still be identiﬁed.
An alternative way to control for unobserved pair-speciﬁc heterogeneity is diﬀer-
ing the data (FD), which is done in speciﬁcation (5.2). It yields a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimator that measures the changes on trade value if and when a
country pair implements sanctions (and stops them again). The drawback is that
observations are lost, if trade ﬂows are not observed in one of the years.
∆ln(Xij,t) = β1SANCij,t∆ +
3∑
k=0
βt−k∆RTAij,t−k + ρ∆INTL_BRDRij,t
+ µi,t + λj,t + ∆ij,t. (5.2)
In the presence of heteroscedasticity, however, all three speciﬁcations above are po-
tentially biased and inconsistent due to the logarithmic form of the gravity model.
The PPML approach proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) performs well
under these circumstances, since it makes use of the multiplicative form of the
gravity model. Another major advantage of the PPML method is that it allows to
incorporate country pairs with zero trade ﬂows without any manipulation of the
data. Zero trade ﬂows mostly occur for small countries. Since these countries are
often the targets of sanctions, it could potentially bias the results if they are left
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out. This is why speciﬁcation (5.3) given below is the preferred speciﬁcation.
Xij,t = exp
[
β1SANCij,t +
3∑
k=0
βt−kRTAij,t−k + ρINTL_BRDRij,t
+ µi,t + λj,t + ϑij
]
∗ ij,t (5.3)
The explanatory variables are the same as in speciﬁcation (5.1), as are the ﬁxed
eﬀects.
5.5 Results
This section presents the results of the empirical estimations. In the ﬁrst subsec-
tion, I show and discuss partial trade destruction eﬀects. In the second subsection,
I aim to capture trade diversion eﬀects.
5.5.1 Trade destruction
Table 5.2 presents the estimation results of the diﬀerent gravity speciﬁcations (5.1)
to (5.3). For the sake of readability, only the explanatory variable of interest is
shown.4 All speciﬁcations include sender-year and target-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Addi-
tional controls include RTAs together with 3-, 6-, and 9-year lags and an indicator
for the occurrence of international trade. In addition, speciﬁcations (5.1) and (5.3)
include trade pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the
country-pair level, as it is common in the literature. However, in a panel gravity
context, there are several other dimensions in which the errors may be correlated:
at the sender, target, year, sender-year, target-year, and country-pair level, re-
spectively (Cameron et al., 2011). Therefore, I report standard errors that are
clustered at these six dimensions (multi-way) for the variables of interest as well,
following Egger and Tarlea (2015). This clustering inﬂuences the size of the stand-
ard errors, and therefore, the level of signiﬁcance of the reported coeﬃcients.5 I
4For tables with the full list of covariates, please see Appendix 5.A
5If not speciﬁed otherwise, levels of signiﬁcance are based on country-pair clustered errors.
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report the within-R2 for the FE and FD regressions and follow the method de-
scribed by Tenreyro for the PPML R2 by computing the square of the correlation
between trade and ﬁtted values.6
Table 5.2: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method: FE FD
PPML with
FE sample
PPML with
full sample
Sanctions -0.074 0.003 -0.085 -0.086
(0.033)** (0.034) (0.039)** (0.038)**
[0.037]** [0.035] [0.050]* [0.050]*
{0.060} {0.047} {0.062} {0.064}
N 93828 70826 93828 132497
within R2 0.0019 0.0003 0.0007 0.0007
Gravity controls yes yes yes yes
Pair ﬁxed eﬀects yes no yes yes
LHS variable columns (1) & (2): ln(export value), columns (3) & (4):
export value. All estimations include sender-year and target-year ﬁxed
eﬀects. Gravity controls include dummies for RTAs, RTA lags, and
international trade. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered at
country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The result of the FE estimation in column (1) shows that sanctions have a negative
eﬀect on the value of trade, on average of -7.1 percent (= 100[e−0.074 − 1]). The
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Column (2) shows the result for the FD approach instead of pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Since
the ﬁrst period is lost due to the estimation process, the sample size is smaller.
The implementation of sanctions now seems to have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on trade.
In the last two columns the results of the preferred estimation method using PPML
are presented. To show the diﬀerence between the FE and PPML estimators,
column (3) shows the estimation results using the same sample size as the FE of
column (1), covering only positive trade ﬂows. At the 10 percent level of signi-
ﬁcance, the coeﬃcient predicts an average decrease of -8.1 percent on the value
of bilateral trade if sanctions are implemented. Finally, the last column makes
use of the full sample including zero trade ﬂows. The negative eﬀect of sanctions
on trade is -8.2 percent. This -8.2 percent decrease translates to a reduction of
6See her homepage for details, http://personal.lse.ac.uk/tenreyro/LGW.html
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exports from the EU to Russia of about 12.9 billion USD due to active sanctions
for 2016. The results of the preferred PPML estimation approaches in column (4)
appear to be robust and are close to the FE result from column (1), even though
the sample size diﬀers by over 38,000 observations.
Table 5.3: Test for exogeneity of policy variables: PPML estimation
(1) (2)
Estimation method: PPML
RTA 0.337 0.347
(0.034)*** (0.034)***
[0.046]*** [0.048]***
{0.052}*** {0.066}***
RTA lead -0.035
(0.021)*
[0.032]
{0.080}
Sanctions -0.088 -0.080
(0.038)** (0.042)*
[0.051]* [0.052]*
{0.069} {0.069}
Sanctions lead 0.037
(0.032)
[0.041]
{0.060}
N 132497 132497
R2 0.0007 0.0007
Gravity controls yes yes
LHS for estimation methods: export value. Gravity controls include dummies for
international trade. All estimations include importer-year, exporter-year, and
country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. The lead is three years. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust, clustered at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
A big issue when estimating trade policy is the endogeneity of its implementation.
It is not a far stretch to believe that countries are potentially reluctant to imple-
ment extensive sanctions against important trading partners but may be less so in
implementing limited or moderate ones. A similar line of reasoning may hold true
for RTAs. Country pair ﬁxed eﬀects or using the ﬁrst diﬀerence should take care
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of this issue. To test whether strict exogeneity of the trade policy variables can
be assumed, future leads are included within the preferred estimation speciﬁcation
(5.3) following Wooldridge (2010). Table 5.3 shows the results. Both, the future
lead for RTAs as well as the future lead for sanctions are returned close to zero
and insigniﬁcant when standard errors are clustered at country pairs or multi-way,
allowing for the interpretation that future formation of trade agreements or future
implementation of sanctions have no inﬂuence on the value of trade in the current
period. These ﬁndings support the claim that there is no anticipation eﬀect.
Table 5.4 oﬀers new insights into the composition of the sanctions eﬀect from Table
5.2. Here, I diﬀerentiate between the three types of sanctions, limited, moderate,
and extensive, respectively. Each type is estimated individually in the columns
(1) to (3) and they are estimated together in column (4). The estimation methods
are the same as in Table 5.2. As additional controls all estimations include RTA
dummies, 3-, 6-, and 9-year lags and dummies for international trade. In addition,
all speciﬁcations include sender-year and target-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Except for the
FD approach all estimations include country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects as well.
Panel A provides results for the FE speciﬁcation (5.1). The coeﬃcient for limited
sanctions is negative but does not signiﬁcantly eﬀect trade which makes economic
sense, as limited sanctions do not target trade but individuals via travel bans and
ﬁnancial asset freezes. The coeﬃcient for moderate sanctions predicts a decline of
-8.2 percent on average for the value of trade, which is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level. The eﬀect of extensive sanctions seems to be positive and insigniﬁcant. This
result does not change, whether sanctions are included individually or together.
A diﬀerent picture can be seen estimating it with FD in panel B. Like in Table 5.2,
the FD approach leads to insigniﬁcant results for all three variables of interest, if
they are estimated individually. Limited sanctions are negative, moderate sanc-
tions are close to zero, and the coeﬃcient for extensive sanctions is positive. How-
ever, if all three sanction types are estimated together, the coeﬃcient for moderate
sanctions returns with -0.005 and slightly signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
The preferred PPML speciﬁcation is ﬁrst estimated in panel C.1 using the FE
sample with positive trade ﬂows to make it comparable with the regression from
panel A. The introduction of moderate sanctions dampens trade by -8.1 percent.
The eﬀect of limited sanctions coeﬃcient is again negative but insigniﬁcant. The
coeﬃcient for extensive sanctions is now negative and fairly large, but remains
insigniﬁcant. The results remain the same, if all three sanctions dummies are
included together.
Panel C.2 of the table utilizes the full sample and predicts that moderate sanctions
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Table 5.4: Trade eﬀects of economics sanctions by severity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A Estimation method: FE
Limited sanctions -0.057 -0.057
(0.146) (0.145)
[0.156] (0.156)
{0.140} {0.141}
Moderate sanctions -0.086 -0.086
(0.034)** (0.034)**
[0.037]* [0.037]**
{0.058} {0.060}
Extensive sanctions 0.312 0.312
(0.336) (0.336)
[0.359] [0.359]
{0.182} {0.183}
N 93828 93828 93828 93828
R2 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019
Panel B Estimation method: FD
Limited sanctions -0.043 -0.043
(0.139) (0.139)
[0.143] (0.143)
{0.075} {0.075}
Moderate sanctions 0.005 -0.005
(0.035) (0.035)**
[0.035] [0.035]*
{0.047} {0.047}
Extensive sanctions 0.074 -0.074
(0.296) (0.296)
[0.310] [0.310]
{0.220} {0.220}
N 70826 70826 70826 70826
R2 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Panel C.1 Estimation method: PPML
(with FE sample)
Limited sanctions -0.011 -0.020
(0.057) (0.055)
[0.057] (0.053)
{0.039} {0.039}
Moderate sanctions -0.084 -0.084
(0.038)** (0.038)**
[0.050]* [0.0510*
{0.061} {0.063}
Extensive sanctions -0.458 -0.452
(0.316) (0.315)
[0.388] [0.387]
{0.501} {0.500}
N 93828 93828 93828 93828
R2 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
Panel C.2 Estimation method: PPML
(with full sample)
Limited sanctions -0.021 -0.030
(0.056) (0.057)
[0.063] (0.058)
{0.032} {0.037}
Moderate sanctions -0.086 -0.086
(0.038)** (0.038)**
[0.051]* [0.051]*
{0.063} {0.074}
Extensive sanctions -0.212 -0.212
(0.309) (0.399)
[0.400] [0.399]
{0.181} {0.186}
N 132497 132497 132497 132497
within R2 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
Gravity controls yes yes yes yes
LHS for panel (A) & (B): ln(export value), for panel (C.1) & (C.2): export value
Gravity controls include RTA, RTA lags, and a dummy for international trade.
All estimation methods include sender-year and target-year ﬁxed eﬀects, methods
1, 3, & 4 include pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered
at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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reduce trade by -8.2 percent. In contrast to the previous PPML, the negative eﬀect
of limited sanctions increases, while the coeﬃcient of extensive sanctions decreases.
However, both remain insigniﬁcant.
The overall negative eﬀect of sanctions seems to be driven solely by moderate
sanctions within the sample. Apart from the FD approach, the coeﬃcient remains
fairly robust across all speciﬁcations. Furthermore, it makes no diﬀerence for the
eﬀects of diﬀerent sanction types on trade, whether they are included individually
or together in the regression.
On the ﬁrst glance, it is puzzling that extensive sanctions play no signiﬁcant role
on the value of trade across all speciﬁcations. This counter-intuitive result may
stem from the fact that these sanctions are mostly between countries that did not
trade a lot with each other to begin with, like Syria and Israel. Moreover, the
number of extensive sanctions in the overall sample is very small and there is not
a lot of variation within the observed time period.
These ﬁndings are quite diﬀerent from previous results from the literature, where
the main driver of the negative impact on trade stems from extensive sanctions.
This change in results may be due to moving away from single sender or target
countries and the resulting increase of the sample size and/or due to omitted
variable bias in previous empirical studies.
It is possible that some sanctions began and ended between two three-year inter-
vals. To capture those, I use yearly data instead of intervals in Table 5.5. This
increases the number of observations from around 133,000 to nearly 380,000. In
the ﬁrst column, the general sanctions dummy is used. In columns (2) to (4) I
distinguish once again by severity type and in column (5) I use the three types to-
gether as explanatory variables. All estimations include sender-year, target-year,
and pair ﬁxed eﬀects. As additional controls, dummies for RTAs and international
trade are added.
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, sanctions have a negative impact on the value of exports
by around -5.3 percent. This eﬀect is only signiﬁcant when using heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors.
The average eﬀect of limited sanctions presented in column 2 is given by a coef-
ﬁcient of -0.116 and is signiﬁcant at 5 percent with robust standard errors. This
eﬀect remains statistically signiﬁcant at 10 percent when clustering at country pair
level and multi-way. An implementation of moderate sanctions decreases the trade
value by -5.4 percent. This result is highly signiﬁcant with robust standard errors
and insigniﬁcant otherwise.
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Table 5.5: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: PPML estimation
(annual data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method: PPML
Sanctions -0.055
(0.020)***
[0.037]
{0.042}
Lim. sanctions -0.116 -0.132
(0.049)** (0.054)**
[0.062]* [0.068]*
{0.060}* {0.064}**
Mod. sanctions -0.054 -0.054
(0.021)*** (0.021)***
[0.038] [0.038]
{0.042} {0.050}
Ext. sanctions -0.216 -0.218
(0.154) (0.156)
[0.314] [0.314]
{0.131}* {0.128}*
N 379425 379425 379425 379425 379425
R2 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
Gravity controls yes yes yes yes yes
LHS variable: export value. Gravity controls include dummies for RTAs, RTA lags, and
for international trade. All estimations include importer-year, exporter-year, and country
country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered at country
pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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In the fourth column it can be shown that extensive sanctions decrease trade by
around 19 percent but are they only statistically signiﬁcant from zero at 10 percent
when choosing multi-way clustering.
In column (5), the three severity types are once again estimated together. Like in
Table 5.4, the results do not change and remain very robust.
The yearly eﬀects of sanctions from Table 5.5 are a lot more volatile than the
previous ones and their signiﬁcance strongly depends on the choice of standard
errors. The only persistent negative eﬀect of sanctions stems from the implement-
ation of limited sanctions. This seems counter-intuitive at ﬁrst but it is possible
that moderate and extensive sanctions can somewhat be anticipated, while travel
bans and asset freezes may happen unexpectedly.
Another potential reason for the overall decrease in signiﬁcance is that the data
set grew in size nearly three times when using yearly data instead of intervals but
the number of sanctions did not even double. This may reduce the overall impact
of sanctions in this sample.
5.5.2 Trade diversion
In this subsection, I check for evidence of trade diversion after the imposition
of a sanction within the sample. In analogy to Magee (2008) who focuses on
trade diversion induced by RTAs, I capture trade diversion by means of a dummy
variable. The dummy is equal to unity if either of the two countries is aﬀected by
an active sanction in year t, either as sender or as target. The dummy is zero, if i is
the sender and j is the target of a sanction at time t and it is zero, if neither country
is directly aﬀected by a sanction. This means that trade diversion is deﬁned in
such a way that it only takes a positive value if active sanctions inﬂuence one of
both trade partners. Hence, the variable is not bilateral in nature but monadic.
If trade diversion takes place I expect to ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient that can oﬀset
the negative eﬀect of a sanction. This would translate into a switch in trade away
from a partner that is involved in sanctions toward one or more that are not.
In order to check for trade diversion, it is no longer possible to make use of the
preferred PPML speciﬁcation (5.3) because the trade diversion dummy would be
subsumed by either the sender-time or target-time ﬁxed eﬀect. I use FE and FD
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for the estimation. The respective equations are given below:
ln(Xij,t) = β1SANCij,t + β2TDit + β3TDjt +
3∑
k=0
βt−kRTAij,t−k
+ ρINTL_BRDRij,t + γMLRTijt + ϑij + δi + δj + κt + ij,t (5.4)
and
∆ln(Xij,t) = β1∆SANCij,t + β2∆TDit + β3∆TDjt +
3∑
k=0
βt−kRTAij,t−k
+ ρ∆INTL_BRDRij,t + γ∆MLRTijt + κt + ij,t (5.5)
Since both, sender and targets of sanctions, can potentially divert their trade I
include measures for both, TDit and TDjt, respectively. The explanatory variables
are the same as in speciﬁcation (5.1) but, instead of the country year ﬁxed eﬀects,
year ﬁxed eﬀects κt, sender ﬁxed eﬀects δi, and target ﬁxed eﬀects δj, are included.
Diﬀerencing again takes care of all time invariant ﬁxed eﬀects, therefore only the
year ﬁxed eﬀect, κt, remains in the second equation.
To correct for the omission of country year ﬁxed eﬀects and, therefore, the omission
of measures of prices, I follow the methodology of Baier and Bergstrand (2009)
and use their measure to model country i's multilateral resistance to export and
country j's multilateral resistance to import. MRDISTij,t yields the multilateral
resistance for bilateral distance between country pair ij at year t:
MRDISTij,t =
[(
N∑
k=1
θk,tDISTik
)
+
(
N∑
m=1
θm,tlnDISTmj
)
−
(
N∑
k=1
N∑
m=1
θk,tθm,tlnDISTkm
)]
, (5.6)
with θl,t =
GDPl,t∑N
l GDPl,t
, l ∈ k,m.
The coeﬃcients for the multilateral resistance terms for border crossings of trade,
RTAs, contiguity, and common language over time are deﬁned similarly.
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Table 5.6: Trade-diversion eﬀects of economic sanctions
(1) (2)
Estimation method: FE FD
Sanction 0.078 -0.065
(0.033)** (0.037)*
[0.038]** [0.039]*
{0.122} {0.216}
Trade diversion
of target
0.003 -0.004
(0.002)* (0.002)*
[0.002]* [0.002]*
{0.007} {0.005}
Trade diversion
of sender
0.006 -0.001
(0.001)*** (0.002)
[0.002]*** [0.002]
{0.006} {0.005}
N 93869 70867
within R2 0.0052 0.0005
Gravity controls yes yes
Pair ﬁxed eﬀects yes no
Year ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes
Sender, target ﬁxed eﬀects yes no
LHS variable: ln(export value). Gravity controls include dummies for RTAs,
RTA lags, international trade, and controls for multilateral resistance following
Baier and Bergstrand (2009). Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered
at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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The ﬁndings of both estimations are combined in Table 5.6, which once again only
reports the variables of interest. The result for the FE regression in column (1)
would imply that sanctions seem to have a positive impact on exports to sanctioned
countries. Trade diversion seems to take place within the sample. In the presence
of a sanction, trade to other countries rises on average by 0.6 percent for the
sending country. Target countries seem to be able to divert 0.3 percent of their
trade successfully. The coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level and 10
percent level, respectively.
The coeﬃcients for trade diversion are positive and somewhat signiﬁcant, but the
point estimates are fairly small. A potential explanation is that countries that are
inﬂuenced by sanctions, either as senders or as targets, split their lost trade across
multiple new partners. If each of these new partners absorbs only a fraction of the
total loss due to a sanction, then the changes could vanish in the aggregated value
of exports.
The positive eﬀect of trade diversion for the sending countries is twice the size of
the one for target countries. This makes sense, because sending countries know
about the implementation of sanctions and are able to think about potential new
partners beforehand. The positive coeﬃcient could also be a possible explanation,
why some countries are very quick to implement sanctions. If the implementation
of sanctions does not hurt the value of overall trade of a sending country, policy
makers may not care too much whether the goal of the sanction is actually possible.
The positive eﬀect of sanctions is puzzling and counter-intuitive. It is possible
that the explanatory variables do not control for multilateral resistance as well as
country-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Moreover, the presence of heteroscedasticity potentially
aﬀects both estimators. This may bias the results.
Using FD, the negative direct eﬀect of sanctions re-emerges. Moreover, exports to
targeted countries seem to fall. This lends support to the hypothesis that other
countries reduce exports to a targeted country as well, without formally imposing a
sanction (Early, 2009). Exports of sender countries to other countries do not seem
to be aﬀected. This could mean that senders only impose sanctions on targets
that are not too important for their exports.
The FD-approach performs better with respect to the credibility of the sanctions
dummy. The coeﬃcient returns with -6.5 and is close to the estimated results in
Tables 5.2 and 5.4. A possible interpretation for the negative coeﬃcient for target
trade diversion could be that countries that do not actively impose sanctions show
solidarity with the sender and, as a consequence, additionally divert trade away
from the target. However, this approach most likely suﬀers from the same potential
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endogeneity problems as the FE.
In conclusion, the results are very volatile and depend strongly on the choice of
the estimation method. Furthermore, since multilateral resistance is not controlled
for by country-year ﬁxed eﬀects, it is possible that the results suﬀer from omitted
variable bias. Finally, the preferred PPML method can not be applied as a ro-
bustness test with a data set of this magnitude (yet). Therefore, the results have
to be treated with caution.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
The goal of this chapter was to quantify partial trade eﬀect of sanctions on exports
using a modern estimation technique and to test its robustness against several
econometric speciﬁcations commonly used in the literature. In contrast to previous
research, the sample size is increased and it includes multiple senders and targets
of sanctions. Furthermore, it sheds some light on the question if trade sanctions
are potentially oﬀset by the occurrence of trade diversion. For this, information
containing bilateral international and intra-national trade values has been merged
with gravity controls and with data regarding the imposition- and end-year as well
as the severity of occurring economic sanctions between country pairs.
The evidence presented in the previous section shows that, indeed, trade sanctions
have a signiﬁcant and robust negative impact on the value of trade of around -8
percent when using FE and PPML across three-year intervals. If sanctions are
grouped according to severity, it can be seen that the size of the negative impact
is mostly due to moderate sanctions, which speciﬁcally target single sectors. The
implementation of limited sanctions does not seem inﬂuence trade at all within the
sample. The same holds true for extensive sanctions, which are the main drivers
in related literature.
When applying yearly data, the coeﬃcient of limited sanctions remains statistically
signiﬁcant and predicts a decrease of trade due to sanctions of around -11 percent.
The signiﬁcance of other speciﬁcations depends on the choice of standard errors. It
is possible that there is an anticipation eﬀect for moderate and extensive sanctions,
but not for limited sanctions. Another possible reason is that the yearly data set
includes too few active sanctions relative to the overall sample to signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence trade.
The evidence for trade diversion is volatile within the sample and depends on
the estimation method. If using FE, sanction-sending countries are able to divert
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trade away from sanctioned partners, increasing average trade value on average
by around 0.06 percent. Target countries experience a positive impact of trade
diversion on average trade by 0.04 percent. In addition, the coeﬃcients predict
that sanctions have a positive eﬀect on trade.
With the FD-approach, the sanctions dummy is negative and there is no evidence
for trade diversion regarding countries that are senders of economic sanctions.
However, there appears to be a negative eﬀect of trade diversion for targets of
sanctions.
For future research it would be interesting to include year-sanction interactions
into the estimations to see if diﬀerent types of sanctions behave diﬀerently over
time in order to ﬁnd the optimal duration of a sanction.
New insights regarding the eﬀect of trade diversion could come from applying a
two-step estimation strategy that could allow to estimate trade diversion using
PPML. Moreover, it would be interesting to analyze the eﬀects of sanctions on
sectoral trade, because sanctions typically focus on particular sectors. This would
require more detailed information about sanctions, which is not available at the
moment.
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5.A Additional tables
In the following, all estimation tables are presented with all explanatory variables,
except for the ﬁxed eﬀects dummies. INT_BRDR captures the eﬀect of global-
ization by being 1 if trade across state borders takes place and zero otherwise.
CLNY represents the colony dummy, LANG common language between country
pairs, DIST bilateral distance, and CNTG contiguity. To account for multilateral
resistance, all explanatory variables in Table 5.A.8 except for sanction and trade
diversion are transformed following Baier and Bergstrand (2009) and are given by
mrdis, mrborder, mrrta, mrcntg, mrlang, and mrclny.
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Table 5.A.1: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method: FE FD
PPML with
FE sample
PPML with
full sample
Sanctions -0.074 0.003 -0.085 -0.086
(0.033)** (0.034) (0.039)** (0.038)**
[0.037]** [0.035] [0.050]* [0.050]*
{0.060} {0.047} {0.062} {0.064}
RTA 0.212*** 0.052 0.253*** 0.270***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.053) (0.053)
RTA_LAG3 0.038 0.030 0.132*** 0.133***
(0.034) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027)
RTA_LAG6 0.203*** 0.164*** 0.029 0.030
(0.037) (0.035) (0.022) (0.022)
RTA_LAG9 0.130*** 0.018 -0.027 -0.033
(0.038) (0.038 (0.028) (0.028)
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.424*** -0.727*** -0.398*** -0.411***
(0.125) (0.140) (0.043) (0.045)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.437*** -0.647*** -0.400*** -0.409***
(0.106) (0.117) (0.043) (0.044)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.400*** -0.554*** -0.479*** -0.491***
(0.092) (0.099) (0.035) (0.036)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.281*** -0.367*** -0.330*** -0.332***
(0.081) (0.086) (0.030) (0.030)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.262*** -0.311*** -0.219*** -0.222***
(0.068) (0.071) (0.028) (0.028)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.155*** -0.189*** -0.158*** -0.160***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.016) (0.016)
N 93828 70826 93828 132497
within R2 0.0019 0.0003 0.0007 0.0007
Pair ﬁxed eﬀects yes no yes yes
Sender-year, target-year
ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes
LHS variable columns (1) & (2): ln(export value), columns (3) & (4): export value
Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered at country pair level, and multi-way
clustered, respectively. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5.A.2: Test for exogeneity of policy variables: PPML estimation
(1) (2)
Estimation method: PPML
RTA 0.337*** 0.347***
(0.034)*** (0.034)***
[0.046]*** [0.048]***
{0.052}*** {0.066}***
RTA lead -0.035
(0.021)*
[0.032]
{0.080}
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.452*** -0.472***
(0.041) (0.032)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.409*** -0.431***
(0.043) (0.031)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.472*** -0.494***
(0.037) (0.026)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.325*** -0.350***
(0.037) (0.026)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.227*** -0.226***
(0.029) (0.029)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.159*** -0.158***
(0.015) (0.015)
Sanctions -0.088* -0.080
(0.038)** (0.042)*
[0.051]* [0.052]*
{0.069} {0.069}
Sanctions lead 0.037
(0.032)
[0.041]
{0.060}
N 132497 132497
R2 0.0007 0.0007
LHS for estimation methods: export value. All estimations include importer-year,
exporter-year, and country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. The lead is three years. Standard
errors in parentheses are robust, clustered at country pair level, and multi-way
clustered, respectively. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5.A.3: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: FE estimation
(1) (2) (3)
lim. sanctions mod. sanctions ext. sanctions
RTA 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.213***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
RTA_LAG3 0.038 0.038 0.038
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
RTA_LAG6 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.204***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
RTA_LAG9 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.131***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.424*** -0.424*** -0.424***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.436*** -0.436*** -0.436***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.399*** -0.399*** -0.399***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.281*** -0.281*** -0.281***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.261***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.154***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Sanction type -0.057 -0.086 0.310
(0.146) (0.034)** (0.336)
[0.156] [0.037]** [0.359]
{0.140} {0.058} {0.182}
N 93828 93828 93828
within R2 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019
LHS for estimation methods: export value. All estimations include importer-year,
exporter-year, and country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses
are robust, clustered at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5.A.4: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: FD estimation
(1) (2) (3)
lim. sanctions mod. sanctions ext. sanctions
D.RTA 0.053 0.053 0.053
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
D.RTA_LAG3 0.030 0.030 0.030
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
D.RTA_LAG6 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
D.RTA_LAG9 0.018 0.018 0.018
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
D.INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.728*** -0.728*** -0.728***
(0.140) (0.140) (0.140)
D.INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.649*** -0.648*** -0.648***
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
D.INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.557*** -0.557*** -0.557***
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099)
D.INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.372*** -0.372*** -0.372***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
D.INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.310*** -0.310*** -0.310***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
D.INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
D.sanction type -0.043 0.005 0.074
(0.139) (0.035) (0.296)
[0.143] [0.035] [0.310]
{0.075} {0.047} {0.220}
N 70826 70826 70826
within R2 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
LHS for estimation methods: export value. All estimations include importer-year and
exporter-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered at
country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively. p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5.A.5: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: PPML estimation
(FE sample)
(1) (2) (3)
lim. sanctions mod. sanctions ext. sanctions
RTA 0.251*** 0.253*** 0.251***
(0.051) (0.053) (0.051)
RTA_LAG3 0.137*** 0.132*** 0.137***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
RTA_LAG6 0.027 0.029 0.028
(0.024) (0.022) (0.024)
RTA_LAG9 -0.022 -0.027 -0.022
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.377*** -0.398*** -0.377***
(0.049) (0.043) (0.049)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.380*** -0.400*** -0.379***
(0.047) (0.043) (0.047)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.465*** -0.479*** -0.465***
(0.038) (0.035) (0.038)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.322*** -0.330*** -0.322***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.033)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.215*** -0.219*** -0.215***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.154*** -0.158*** -0.154***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Sanction type -0.011 -0.084 -0.458
(0.057) (0.038)** (0.316)
[0.057] [0.050]* [0.388]
{0.039} {0.061} {0.501}
N 93828 93828 93828
R2 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
LHS for estimation methods: export value. All estimations include importer-year,
exporter-year, and country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses
are robust, clustered at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
134
Chapter 5
Table 5.A.6: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: PPML estimation
(full sample)
(1) (2) (3)
lim. sanctions mod. sanctions ext. sanctions
RTA 0.267*** 0.270*** 0.267***
(0.051) (0.053) (0.051)
RTA_LAG3 0.139*** 0.133*** 0.139***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
RTA_LAG6 0.029 0.030 0.029
(0.024) (0.022) (0.024)
RTA_LAG9 -0.028 -0.033 -0.028
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.389*** -0.411*** -0.389***
(0.050) (0.045) (0.050)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.388*** -0.409*** -0.388***
(0.049) (0.044) (0.049)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.478*** -0.491*** -0.478***
(0.039) (0.036) (0.039)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.324*** -0.332*** -0.324***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.033)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.217*** -0.222*** -0.218***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.156*** -0.160*** -0.156***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Sanction type -0.021 -0.086 -0.212
(0.056) (0.038)** (0.309)
[0.063] [0.051]* [0.400]
{0.063} {0.051} {0.400}
N 132497 132497 132497
R2 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
LHS for estimation methods: export value. All estimations include importer-year,
exporter-year, and country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses
are robust, clustered at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5.A.7: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: PPML estimation
(annual data)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sanctions Lim. sanctions Mod. sanctions Ext. sanctions
RTA 0.330*** 0.330*** 0.330*** 0.330***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.470*** -0.459*** -0.470*** -0.459***
(0.034) (0.038) (0.034) (0.038)
INTL_BRDR_1988 -0.446*** -0.436*** -0.446*** -0.436***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.035) (0.038)
INTL_BRDR_1989 -0.430*** -0.418*** -0.430*** -0.418***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.428*** -0.416*** -0.427*** -0.416***
(0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035)
INTL_BRDR_1991 -0.447*** -0.436*** -0.447*** -0.436***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
INTL_BRDR_1992 -0.484*** -0.475*** -0.484*** -0.475***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.492*** -0.484*** -0.491*** -0.484***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031)
INTL_BRDR_1994 -0.434*** -0.426*** -0.434*** -0.426***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031)
INTL_BRDR_1995 -0.364*** -0.357*** -0.364*** -0.357***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.344*** -0.340*** -0.344*** -0.340***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
INTL_BRDR_1997 -0.285*** -0.280*** -0.285*** -0.280***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034)
INTL_BRDR_1998 -0.280*** -0.276*** -0.280*** -0.276***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.225*** -0.222*** -0.225*** -0.223***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
INTL_BRDR_2000 -0.093*** -0.089*** -0.093*** -0.090***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
INTL_BRDR_2001 -0.132*** -0.130*** -0.132*** -0.130***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.157*** -0.155*** -0.157*** -0.155***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
INTL_BRDR_2003 -0.144*** -0.142*** -0.144*** -0.143***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
INTL_BRDR_2004 -0.066*** -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.064***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Sanction type -0.055 -0.116 -0.054 -0.216
(0.020)*** (0.049)** (0.021)*** (0.157)
[0.037] [0.062]* [0.038] [0.314]
{0.042} {0.060}* {0.042} {0.131}*
N 379425 379425 379425 379425
R2 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
LHS for estimation methods: export value. All estimations include importer-year, exporter-year,
and country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered at country pair
level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5.A.8: Trade-diversion eﬀects of economic sanctions
(1) (2)
Estimation method: FE FD
Sanction 0.078 -0.065
(0.033)** (0.037)*
[0.038]** [0.039]*
{0.122} {0.216}
Trade diversion
of target
0.003 -0.004
(0.002)* (0.002)*
[0.002]* [0.002]*
{0.007} {0.005}
Trade diversion
of sender
0.006 -0.001
(0.001)*** (0.002)
[0.002]*** [0.002]
{0.006} {0.005}
mrdis 52.525*** -34.226**
(14.419) (16.027)
mrborder -598.846*** 225.881*
(123.027) (135.274)
mrrta 67.920*** -15.583
(11.441) (13.928)
mrcntg 1197.672*** 233.236**
(96.464) (107.961)
mrlang -94.444** -75.458*
(42.925) (45.499)
mrclny -58.161 151.770*
(77.259) (77.694)
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.540*** -0.767***
(0.063) (0.138)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.447*** -0.642***
(0.056) (0.110)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.506*** -0.562***
(0.052) (0.092)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.345*** -0.359***
(0.046) (0.072)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.255*** -0.276***
(0.037) (0.053)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.164*** -0.177***
(0.031) (0.034)
RTA 0.174*** 0.031
(0.034) (0.032)
RTA_LAG3 0.013 -0.007
(0.029) (0.028)
RTA_LAG6 0.093*** 0.086***
(0.030) (0.030)
RTA_LAG9 0.048 0.090***
(0.031) (0.034)
N 93869 70867
R2 0.883 0.028
Pair ﬁxed eﬀects yes no
Year ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes
Sender, target ﬁxed eﬀects yes no
LHS variable: ln(export value). Controls for multilateral resistance follow
Baier and Bergstrand (2009). Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered
at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Conclusion
In this doctoral thesis, I set out to empirically analyze the impact of diﬀerent trade
barriers on the value of bilateral trade by means of a structural gravity approach.
This chapter summarizes and discusses the main ﬁndings.
In contrast to anecdotal evidence, the world does not seem to have become sig-
niﬁcantly "ﬂatter" in the last ﬁve decades, despite a persistent drop of transport
costs and tariﬀs. The level of openness is only about 30 percent of what it could
be, if there were no impediments to trade (Head & Mayer, 2013). The intention of
this thesis was to oﬀer new insights regarding this globalization gap by empirically
analyzing barriers to trade.
Chapter 2 served to give a background of the evolution of the empirical method
utilized in the empirical analyses that followed, the gravity equation. The chapter
outlined the ﬁrst adaption of the gravity equation in the ﬁeld of international
economics by Tinbergen (1962) and its theoretical and econometric evolution to
show how and why it became one of the most successful frameworks in international
economics.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) as well as Head and Mayer (2013) show that a
large portion of barriers to trade is not directly observable. According to Grossman
(1998), one of the most important unobservable barriers to trade arises due to cul-
tural diﬀerences. Many researchers have introduced diﬀerent proxies like language
and trust to quantify the eﬀect of culture on trade (with mixed results). Chapter
3 added to this branch of literature and oﬀered new insights by introducing the
GLOBE research study by House et al. (2013) as a new proxy for cultural values.
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For each of the nine GLOBE dimensions I computed a measure for cultural dis-
tance and cultural proximity and estimated the eﬀect of each dimension on trade
using the product classiﬁcation by Rauch (1999). In my cross-section analysis I
used various econometric speciﬁcations ranging from traditional OLS to the state-
of-the-art PPML together with intra-national trade (Yotov, 2012) and a measure
for globalization (Bergstrand et al., 2015). My results show that cultural diﬀer-
ences (or proximity) signiﬁcantly impact trade but the size and direction of the
eﬀect varies across the cultural dimensions. Some dimensions have no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on trade, others seem to have a negative impact on trade while others posit-
ively inﬂuence the trade value. This may serve as further evidence on the diﬃcult
task of generalizing the eﬀects of cultural diﬀerences on trade. The diﬀerentiation
by commodity groups oﬀered new insights as well: Several cultural eﬀects are only
signiﬁcant for homogeneous or diﬀerentiated goods and are not signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ent from zero in the aggregate goods case. Beyond that, this essay has illustrated
the importance of proper econometric speciﬁcations, as the results dramatically
depend on the econometric methods.
Chapter 4 built on the previous analysis by, once again, using the GLOBE data
set. The research question was if and how the impact of cultural diﬀerences on
trade changes over time by making use of a panel regression. Additionally, this
approach allowed to address one of the main issues from the previous chapter,
namely that cross-sections potentially suﬀer from unobserved heterogeneity bias
(Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). The preferred speciﬁcation was a state-of-the-art
PPML speciﬁcation with a comprehensive set of ﬁxed eﬀects including country-
pair ﬁxed eﬀects (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007), intra-national trade ﬂows (Yotov,
2012), and a globalization measure (Bergstrand et al., 2015).
The results display that the impact of several cultural dimensions on trade changes
over time but the eﬀect of the cultural dimensions does not follow a clear trend
that can be readily attributed to an increased exposure to globalization. Some
eﬀects grow in size, while others decrease over time. Some show a positive and
some a negative impact on trade. Like in the previous chapter, the signiﬁcance and
magnitude of the eﬀect of several cultural dimensions is diﬀerent when comparing
homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods. Since the sample only covers a small part
of the globalization trend and does not cover more recent years, the results may
change if the sample size is increased. Unfortunately, recent intra-national trade
data on the industry level is not (yet) available for all countries of the sample.
The aim of chapter 5 was to quantify the impact of economic sanctions on bilateral
trade. Most previous literature in this area use mis-speciﬁed gravity equations
and/or smaller data sets. I estimated the eﬀects using the well-speciﬁed PPML
approach from the previous chapters together with the TIES data set by Morgan
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et al. (2014) from 1987 to 2005. I divided sanctions into groups according to
their severity and ﬁnd that moderate sanctions, instead of limited or extensive
sanctions, are the drivers of the signiﬁcant reduction of the value of bilateral trade.
I additionally searched for evidence that would indicate if sanctioning or sanctioned
countries are able to divert their trade to other partners but I do not ﬁnd robust
evidence for this behavior. Potentially, the aggregation of trade data masks the
diversion eﬀect. For further research in this area, it would be interesting to dis-
aggregate the value of trade to the industry level in order to analyze the impact
of speciﬁcally targeted sectors. Potentially, this would allow to identify signiﬁcant
trade diversion. Moreover, it could be beneﬁcial to increase the scope of the
data set to include the most recent decade in which several sanctions ended, for
example the ones of the UN against Iran in 20151. Furthermore, new sanctions
were implemented, like the ones of the EU, the USA, and Canada against Russia
in 2014. Unfortunately, TIES does not cover this decade (yet).
In my analyses I focused on identifying partial eﬀects of selected trade barriers.
For further research the structure of the gravity model and the provided results
could be exploited to identify theory-consistent general equilibrium eﬀects of these
barriers to trade.
From the perspective of a trade economist, a completely globalized world would
be an ideal situation. The globalization process has lead to more eﬃcient markets,
lower prices, and higher quality due to increased competition. It stabilized security
due to growing ﬁnancial involvement between countries, that potentially keeps
them from escalating conﬂicts. Furthermore, it has lead to higher living standards
across the globe, especially in developing countries. The goal should therefore
be to decrease the globalization gap by removing trade barriers. As it has been
stated in the beginning of the thesis, barriers to trade are persistent and seem to
be oblivious to the recent improvements in means of transport and technology.
My contributions in the previous chapters showed that unobservable, deep rooted
cultural values that diﬀer across countries (continue to) distort trade despite the
trend of growing globalization. Since cultural values are not prone to change easily,
the world will never be truly "ﬂat". However, the results showed that there is a
silver lining as well: cultural diﬀerences do not necessarily have a negative impact
on trade. Depending on the dimension, they can be beneﬁcial to the value of trade.
In contrast to the deeply rooted trade barriers, which can not (and maybe should
not) be abolished easily, it would be simple to reduce other types of barriers:
Sanctions could be stopped immediately, which would stop the ongoing disruption
1If only for a short duration of time thanks to the most recent changes in US foreign policy
(2018).
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of trade ﬂows. As sanctions only reach the desired goal in 1/3 of all cases, maybe
it is time to think of other political tools that do not inﬂuence trade.
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